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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the impact of data integrity/quality in the supervi-
sory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system on real-time locational marginal
price (LMP) in electricity market operations. Measurement noise and/or manipu-
lated sensor errors in a SCADA system may mislead system operators about real-
time conditions in a power system, which, in turn, may impact the price signals in
real-time power markets. This dissertation serves as a first attempt to analytically
investigate the impact of bad/malicious data on electric power market operations. In
future power system operations, which will probably involve many more sensors, the
impact of sensor data integrity/quality on grid operations will become increasingly
important.
The first part of this dissertation studies from a market participant’s perspective
a new class of malicious data attacks on state estimation, which subsequently influ-
ences the result of the newly emerging look-ahead dispatch models in the real-time
power market. In comparison with prior work of cyber attack on static dispatch
where no inter-temporal ramping constraint is considered, we propose a novel at-
tack strategy, named ramp-induced data (RID) attack, with which the attacker can
manipulate the limits of ramp constraints of generators in look-ahead dispatch. It
is demonstrated that the proposed attack can lead to financial profits via malicious
capacity withholding of selected generators, while being undetected by the existing
bad data detection algorithm embedded in today’s state estimation software.
In the second part, we investigate from a system operator’s perspective the sen-
sitivity of locational marginal price (LMP) with respect to data corruption-induced
state estimation error in real-time power market. Two data corruption scenarios are
ii
considered, in which corrupted continuous data (e.g., the power injection/flow and
voltage magnitude) falsify power flow estimate whereas corrupted discrete data (e.g.,
the on/off status of a circuit breaker) do network topology estimate, thus leading
to the distortion of LMP. We present an analytical framework to quantify real-time
LMP sensitivity subject to continuous and discrete data corruption via state estima-
tion. The proposed framework offers system operators an analytical tool to identify
economically sensitive buses and transmission lines to data corruption as well as find
sensors that impact LMP changes significantly.
This dissertation serves as a first step towards rigorous understanding of the
fundamental coupling among cyber, physical and economical layers of operations in
future smart grid.
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1. INTRODUCTION∗
1.1 Motivation and Overview
Managing and understanding the electric grid data is an increasing concern for
Independent System Operators (ISOs), utilities, Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and
market participants. As more and more sensing devices such as smart meters and
synchrophasors are deployed in the power system, it is prudent for future electric
grid operators to understand the fundamental impact of data quality on resilient
physical and market operations. Furthermore, data integrity is closely related to
cybersecurity that may occur in the power industry. For instance, data manipulated
by an intelligent adversary may result in misleading system operators and smart grid
control systems, thus resulting in the severe malfunction of physical and financial grid
operations. To meet the challenges in data quality and data integrity, we propose
a framework to analyze and design robust cyber-physical electric energy systems
with the presence of bad/malicious data. In this dissertation, we introduce and test
a resilient operating paradigm against bad/malicious data for smart grid market
operations.
Currently, the operations of the physical power systems and the wholesale level
electricity markets are controlled by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)
(e.g., ISO-New England, PJM, ERCOT and CAISO). RTOs conduct state estimation
and economic dispatch in the two representative software systems, which are Energy
Management System (EMS) and Market Management System (MMS), respectively.
∗This section is in part a reprint of the material in the papers: D.-H. Choi and L. Xie, “Ramp-
Induced Data Attacks on Look-Ahead Dispatch in Real-Time Power Markets”, IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1235-1243, September 2013 and D.-H. Choi and L. Xie, “Sensitiv-
ity Analysis of Real-Time Locational Marginal Price to SCADA Sensor Data Corruption”, IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems with DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2013.2293634.
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Given the stronger coupling among EMS/MMS, heterogeneous cyber devices (e.g.,
PMUs, smart meters), and communication networks (e.g., NASPInet [1]), and phys-
ical power systems, the future smart grid must cope with a variety of data integrity
attacks in this cyber-physical system. Furthermore, future power system operations
will probably involve data acquisition and processing by a large number of sensors.
Therefore, maintaining sensor data quality and data integrity will become increas-
ingly important for reliable and economical grid operations.
The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of bad data and
malicious data attacks on real-time electricity market operations via state estima-
tion. A key part of this research is to understand the coupling among the following
three components: (1) bad/malicious data; (2) state estimation; and (3) economic
dispatch. In this dissertation, data represent measurements collected by massively
deployed sensors in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Bad
data refer to sensors’ measurements that have large errors beyond typical confidence
interval of random Gaussian noise. Bad data usually occur due to meter malfunction,
telecommunication system failure, and unexpected communication noise. In compar-
ison with naturally generated bad data, malicious data are designed and injected into
normal sensor data by an intelligent adversary that is capable of optimizing the ef-
fectiveness and the stealth nature of the attack. State estimation and economic
dispatch are core functions in EMS and MMS, respectively. State estimation con-
verts redundant SCADA sensor measurements and other available information into
an estimate of the state of an interconnected electric power system.Economic dis-
patch generates the optimal generation dispatch and nodal price, otherwise known
as locational marginal price (LMP). In real-time electricity markets, security con-
strained economic dispatch (SCED) is conducted to calculate LMP in the two main
real-time pricing models: the ex-ante and ex-post models [2, 3, 4].
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Figure 1.1: Information flow among cyber-physical components.
We first consider from a market participant’s perspective a potential attack prob-
lem in which the attacker stealthily manipulates an estimate of the system state by
injecting false data into the sensor’s measurements. This manipulated estimate is
fed into economic dispatch module in MMS and subsequently changes operational
constraints embedded in economic dispatch formulation. As a result, the attacker
generates the wrong optimal generation outputs and changes the nodal prices in the
desired direction. Second, we examine from a system operator’ perspective the im-
pact of bad/malicious data on the nodal price. The development of an analytical
framework to quantify such impact is necessary because it enables system operators
to identify economically sensitive buses with respect to data corruption as well as
prioritize sensor data quality upgrades in view of robust market operations. Fig. 1.1
shows the information flow among the physical power system and aforementioned
three components. It should be noted from this figure that bad and malicious data
have an adverse chain-effect on economic dispatch process via state estimation.
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1.2 Malicious Data Attack on Economic Dispatch
1.2.1 Prior Work
A large body of literature has been accumulated recently on the subject of cyber
security in power grids, ranging from risk mitigation [5], generation control security
(e.g., automatic generation control (AGC) attack [6, 7]), control security in distri-
bution system [8], and privacy protection [9, 10, 11, 12]. A concise summary paper
is presented in [13], including risk assessment methodology, power system control
application and cyber infrastructure security. Meanwhile, many researchers have
been studying false data injection attacks, which malfunction the state estimator by
injecting false data into sensors. For the subject of false data injection attacks, two
major categories of work have been presented:
• Vulnerability analysis of state estimation: a false data injection attack against
DC state estimation was formulated and analyzed in [14, 15]. Efficient algo-
rithm to find sparse attacks and Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) placement
algorithm to prevent sparse attacks were developed in [16, 17]. Various attack
strategies against distributed state estimation were proposed and their impacts
were quantified [18]. As work following [18], a fully distributed attack detection
scheme based on local measurements was proposed to detect such attacks. A
distributed joint detection-estimation approach to malicious data attack was
presented in [19]. In [20], it was shown that the attacker can hack the power grid
without the knowledge of the power network topology, which can be estimated
using linear independent component analysis (ICA). A false data injection at-
tack against AC state estimation was proposed in [21] and its effect on AC
state estimation performance was investigated in more detail [22]. Graph the-
ory based algorithm was proposed, which determines the type and number of
4
measurements compromised by the attacker to bypass bad data detection.
• Financial risk analysis in electricity market operations: this area examined
the economic impact of false data injection attacks on electricity market oper-
ations. In [23], a conceptual four-layer framework consisting in the physical,
communication/control, market layer, and a cyber security layer was proposed
and the impact of cyber attack on marker layer was assessed. Undetectable
and profitable attack strategies, which exploit virtual bidding mechanism, were
proposed in [24]. In [25], a more general malicious data attack problem was for-
mulated in the real-time electricity market. In [26], the scenario for the attacker
and defender was modeled as a zero-sum game between them, and simulation
results showed the effectiveness of attack on the real-time market prices. Met-
rics were developed to evaluate the economic impact of data integrity attacks
under economic dispatch process using optimal power flow methods in [27].
However, the proposed attacks were characterized in static economic dispatch with-
out modeling inter-temporal constraints.
1.2.2 Main Contributions
In Section 3, we present a new class of false data injection attacks on state
estimation, which may lead to financial arbitrage in real-time power markets with
an emerging look-ahead dispatch model.
Motivated by the increasing penetration of variable resources such as wind and
solar [28], look-ahead dispatch has been implemented by major Independent Sys-
tem Operators (ISOs)/Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) in the past few
years in order to improve the market dispatch efficiency [29, 30, 31]. Look-ahead
dispatch is different from conventional static dispatch in that it calculates the opti-
mal dispatch in an extended period of time, taking into account inter-temporal ramp
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rates of generators of different technologies. In recent work [24, 25], the proposed at-
tacks against state estimation were characterized in static economic dispatch without
modeling inter-temporal ramping constraint.
In comparison with this prior work of cyber attack on static dispatch, we propose a
novel attack strategy with which the attacker can manipulate, in look-ahead dispatch,
the limits of ramp constraints of generators. The main contributions of this section
are two-fold:
• We formulate a malicious ramp-induced data (RID) attack problem in look-
ahead dispatch. The attacker could stealthily change the ramp constraint limits
of generators through manipulating sensors data, aiming at increasing the nodal
price by withholding capacity of generator.
• We propose a RID attack strategy with which the attacker could make a profit
without being detected by RTOs in the real-time electricity market. The attack
strategy for undetectability and profitability is formulated as an optimization
problem in which the attacker computes the attack vector injected into sensors.
The feasibility of such cyber attacks and their economic impact on real-time
electricity market operations are illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system.
1.3 Sensitivity Analysis of LMP to Data Corruption
1.3.1 Prior Work
Real-time market LMPs are primarily affected by a system’s physical conditions,
which are the results of state estimation routine. A study of LMP sensitivity with
respect to system physical conditions was first conducted by Conejo et al. [32]. In
this work, the LMP sensitivity problem was formulated in nonlinear programming
based on the AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) model. It provided a generalized
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platform for calculating the sensitivity of LMP with respect to changes in various
parameters such as load, generator cost, voltage limit, generation power limit, and
network topology. Sensitivity studies have also been conducted with linear program-
ming based on the DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) model with a DCOPF-based
algorithm [33], the probabilistic model [34], and the continuous locational marginal
pricing approach [35]. All previous work has focused mainly on the impact of phys-
ical load variations on LMP sensitivity. More recently, some work has studied the
economic impact of cyber data attacks on real-time power market operations. This
recent work has demonstrated that continuous data corruption from an adversary can
bypass the Chi-squares bad data detection [14, 36], consequently leading to LMP dis-
tortion due to state estimation error [24, 25]. In addition, it has been recently demon-
strated that malicious topology data attacks due to discrete data corruption [37, 38]
could completely bypass topology error processing in state estimation software. As
a result, they may generate an undetectable misconfigured network topology, which,
in turn, results in misleading state estimation and economic dispatch. However, no
analytic study for quantifying the impact of undetectable continuous and discrete
data corruption on LMP sensitivity has been done yet.
1.3.2 Main Contributions
Section 4 focuses on the development of an analytical framework for answering
the following question:
• How much does LMP change at every bus given a set of SCADA measurements
with corrupted data?
Specifically, we investigate the sensitivity of real-time LMP with respect to state
estimation error due to continuous (e.g., the power injection/flow and voltage mag-
nitude) and discrete (e.g., the on/off status of a circuit breaker) data corruption.
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In the first part of Section 4, we present an analytical framework to quantify
LMP sensitivity with respect to changes in continuous sensor data. This framework
consists of a unified LMP sensitivity matrix subject to sensor data corruption, which
combines two sensitivity matrices: the first with LMP sensitivity at any bus to any
estimate, and the second with sensitivity of any estimate to data at any sensor. Thus,
this unified sensitivity matrix reflects a coupling among the sensor data, an estima-
tion of the power system states, and the real-time LMP. The proposed framework
offers system operators an online analytical tool to:
1. assess the impact of corrupted data at any sensor on LMP variation at any bus
2. identify buses with LMPs highly sensitive to data corruption
3. find sensors that impact LMP changes significantly and influentially
4. evaluate the impact of SCADA data accuracy on real-time LMP.
The results of the proposed sensitivity based analysis are illustrated and verified with
IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems with both Ex-ante and Ex-post real-time pricing
models.
In the second part of Section 4, we formulate and analyze the impact of power
transmission network topology error due to discrete data corruption on real-time
electricity market prices. We consider the scenario in which the undetected false
status of circuit breakers from topology error processing may lead to wrong modeling
of real-time network topology, which, in turn, misleads the results of state estimation
and real-time economic dispatch. In particular, we focus on the economic impact of
this circuit breaker-induced network topology error on LMP. The main contributions
of this second part is twofold:
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• We propose a simple analytical LMP sensitivity index that explains the rela-
tionship between the change in network topology (i.e., the left-hand side of
constraints in SCED) and LMP.
• The proposed analytical approach is illustrated and verified in the IEEE 14-bus
system. The proposed sensitivity index provides system operators an analytical
tool to identify economically sensitive transmission lines and circuit breakers,
whose status error will significantly impact the real-time LMPs. The validity of
the derived sensitivity index is verified and illustrated with numerical examples
in the IEEE-14 bus system.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of power system state estimation and real-time power market. The weighted lease
squares (WLS) formulation for power system state estimation is introduced along
with bad data processing and topology error processing techniques. Distributed
state estimation and bad data processing methods are briefly reviewed. In real-time
power market, two major real-time pricing models are considered: ex-ante and ex-
post models. Security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) model is formulated
in each pricing model, which relies on state estimation results.
In Section 3, malicious data attack against state estimation in time-coupled look-
ahead dispatch is considered from a market participant’s perspective. We first review
spatial data attack on static dispatch through virtual bidding transaction in day-
ahead and real-time markets. In comparison with the existing spatial data attack,
we propose a temporal data attack strategy with which the attacker can manipulate,
in look-ahead dispatch, the limits of ramp constraints of selected generators through
malicious capacity withholding and make a profit while being undetected by the bad
9
data detection algorithm.
In Section 4, the sensitivity of real-time LMP to sensor data corruption is studied
from a system operator’s perspective. We develop an analytical tool to assess the
ex-ante and ex-post LMP sensitivity subject to state estimation error due to the
corruption in two types of sensor data: continuous (e.g., the power injection/flow
and voltage magnitude) and discrete (e.g., the on/off status of a circuit breaker).
The developed tool enables system operators to identify economically vulnerable
buses, transmission lines and circuit breakers to bad data and malicious data attack
as well as find sensors that impact LMP sensitivity significantly.
In Section 5, we summarize our main contributions in this dissertation and provide
some future research directions.
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2. BACKGROUND∗
2.1 Power System State Estimation
2.1.1 State Estimation Algorithms
State estimation is one of the key functions in control centers’ energy manage-
ment systems (EMSs). A state estimator converts redundant meter readings and
other available information obtained from a supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system into the estimate of the state of an interconnected power system
[39] and distribution system [40]. The computed estimation solution can be utilized
by applications in EMS such as optimal power flow, contingency analysis, automatic
generation control (AGC) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED).
The pioneering work on state estimation was done by Schweppe et al. [41]. A
centralized state estimator embedded in a control center was developed to monitor
static operating conditions of a power system, based on all measurements collected
by deployed sensors in a SCADA system. The practical implementation of state
estimation was considered in [42]. A large number of technical literature related
to centralized state estimation can be found in [43]. Recently, the emergence of
large power systems with increased complexity suggests the need for decentralized
estimation and control in wide area power system operations in order to reduce the
computational burden at a central control center. Several approaches to decentralized
state estimation have been proposed in the literature (see [44, 45], for example, for a
treatment of decentralized iterative algorithms for system analysis and optimization).
∗This section is in part a reprint of the material in the papers: L. Xie, D.-H. Choi, S. Kar, and
H. Vincent Poor, “Fully Distributed State Estimation for Wide-Area Monitoring Systems”, IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1154-1169, September 2012 and D.-H. Choi and
L. Xie, “Fully Distributed Bad Data Processing for Wide Area State Estimation”, 2011 Second
International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, October 2011.
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In [46] and [47] a star-like hierarchical state estimation method was proposed. More
recently the two-level state estimation for multi-area power system has been studied
in [48, 49, 50, 51], driven by the capability and need to conduct WAMS. The local
state estimation obtained at the first level is coordinated at a higher level via synchro-
nized phasor measurements. A survey on multi-area state estimation is summarized
in [52]. Most recently a multilevel state estimator (feeder, substation, transmission
system organization, and regional levels) is described for the purpose of monitoring
large-scale interconnected power systems [53]. However, as the measurement number
and sampling rate increase, hierarchical state estimation approaches may suffer from
communication bottlenecks and computational reliability issues inherent in system
architecture with one single coordination center. A parallel and distributed state es-
timation was envisioned in [54]. By leveraging the naturally decoupled characteristic
of weighted least squares (WLS) estimation, state estimation problem is decomposed
into each area’s local estimator with a coupling constraints optimization technique
to ensure convergence of the boundary buses’ estimates. Numerical results illustrate
that the distributed algorithm could not only speed up the computational time, but
also yields acceptable accuracy. However, local observability of each control area
is always required in the aforementioned algorithms. In other words, all the local
control areas need to have enough measurement redundancy in order to compute
the locally decoupled weighted least squares estimate (excluding the boundary bus
measurements). This assumption may not always hold due to (1) the increasing
vulnerability of measurements subject to potential bad/malicious data, and (2) the
emergence of smaller control areas such as micro-grids. In recent work [55], a fully
distributed static state estimation algorithm with relaxed local observability is ex-
ploited. An iterative distributed state estimation scheme is proposed, under which
the local control areas begin with their own estimates of the entire system, commu-
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nicate their estimates with pre-specified neighboring control areas, and eventually
make all local estimates converge to the centralized state estimation result. Fig. 2.1
contrasts the communication architecture of fully distributed state estimation with
that of hierarchical state estimation in a multi-area power system.
Area 1 
: Information Flow in Hierarchical  SE  
: Information Flow in Fully Distributed  SE  
Central   Control  Center 
Area 2 Area 5 
Area 4 
Area 3 
Local Control  Center 
Figure 2.1: Contrast of communication architecture for hierarchical and fully dis-
tributed state estimation.
The weighted least squares (WLS) method is the most commonly applied one for
estimating the operating conditions of a power system.The measurement model of
the state estimation is formulated as follows:
z = h(x) + e (2.1)
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where z is measurement vector in the form of bus power injections and line power
flows, bus voltage magnitudes and line current flow magnitudes, x is the state vector
of the entire power system with phase angles and bus voltage magnitudes, h(x) is
nonlinear measurement function relating measurements to states, and e is indepen-
dent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian measurement error vector with zero
mean and diagonal covariance matrix R. The WLS will minimize the weighted least
squares of measurement error to compute the optimal estimate of x:
minimize J(x) = rTR−1r (2.2)
s.t. r = z− h(x). (2.3)
Using the Gauss-Newton method, the weighted least squares estimate vector xˆ is
computed by the following iterative procedure:
∆xˆk+1 = [G(xˆk)]−1HT (xˆk)R−1∆zk (2.4)
where H(xˆk) =
[
∂h(xˆk)
∂xˆk
]
is the Jacobian matrix at k-th iteration, and
∆xˆk+1 = xˆk+1 − xˆk (2.5)
∆zk = z− h(xˆk) (2.6)
G(xˆk) = HT (xˆk)R−1H(xˆk). (2.7)
The iteration process in (2.4) continues until the maximum of |∆xˆk| is less than a
predetermined threshold, otherwise stops and yields the ultimate estimates. Here,
G(xˆk) is defined as gain matrix. If this gain matrix is full rank, the network is called
as observable network, and an unique WLS estimation solution is computed finally.
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However, the aforementioned AC state estimation method often faces the diver-
gence of the estimation solution. In addition, real-time market operation such as
security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) is performed based on a DC based
power flow solution. Moreover, as phasor measurement units (PMUs) become more
and more in future smart grid, the measurement functions of PMUs become linear.
Hence, DC state estimation algorithm is applicable for state estimation with PMUs.
With these reasons, DC state estimation is often preferred to AC state estimation.
We present the linearized DC state estimation problem with 1.0 per unit (p.u.)
voltage magnitudes at all buses and j1.0 p.u. branch impedance. Then, the state
vector x is considered as the voltage phase angle vector θ for the entire power system.
Therefore, the nonlinear measurement model for AC state estimation (2.1) is modified
to
z = Hθ + e (2.8)
where the measurement vector z includes only power injections and line flows, and
the elements in the linearized matrix H rely on line susceptance, network topology
and measurement configuration. Centralized state estimation computes the optimal
estimate of θ by minimizing the weighted least squares of measurement error:
minimize J(θ) = rTR−1r (2.9)
s.t. r = z−Hθ. (2.10)
Then, if the system is observable (i.e., the linearized Jacobian matrix H is full rank),
the centralized weighted least squares estimate of θ is given by
θc =
(
H
T
R−1H
)−1
H
T
R−1z = G
−1
H
T
R−1z. (2.11)
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Recently, a fully distributed DC state estimation algorithm in a multi-area power
system is proposed, and the convergence of the proposed algorithm to a centralized
estimation is proven mathematically in [55]. An interconnected multi-area power
system is assumed to be partitioned into a total of N regions, each region n cor-
responding to a geographically non-overlapping control area. Each control area is
allowed, if necessary, to exchange information with its neighboring areas. The mea-
surement model for the multi-area state estimation is formulated as follows:
zn = Hnx+ en (2.12)
where zn is measurement vector (including the boundary injection and flow mea-
surements) in control area n, x is the state vector of the entire interconnected power
system, Hn is linear measurement matrix for control area n, and en is measurement
error vector with zero mean in area n. Then, we assume that the vector of initial
estimate of the states, xn(0) ∈ RM , is deterministic where M is a total number of
buses. A sequence of estimate vectors, {xn(i)}i≥0 is computed by each control area
in a distributed iterative manner. The state estimate vector xn(i + 1) of the n-th
control area at (i+1)-th iteration is a function of: its previous estimate vector; the
communicated estimate vectors at i-th iteration from its neighboring control areas;
and the local measurement vector zn. Based on the current state vector xn(i), the
exchanged data {xl(i)}l∈Ωn, and the measurement vector zn, we update the estimate
of the states at the n-th control area by the following distributed iterative algorithm:
xn(i+ 1) = xn(i)−
[
β(i)
∑
l∈Ωn
(xn(i)− xl(i))− α(i)HTn
(
zn −Hnxn(i)
)]
. (2.13)
In (2.13), Ωn represents the neighborhood of n, {α(i)}, {β(i)} are appropriately
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chosen time-varying weight sequences with α(i) = a
(i+1)τ1
, β(i) = b
(i+1)τ2
. (Here,
a, b > 0 are constants and the exponents τ1, τ2 satisfy 0 < τ1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ τ2 <
τ1). Algorithm (2.13) is distributed because for n-th control area it involves only
the data from the sensors in its neighborhood Ωn. Then, for each n, the estimate
sequence {xn(i)} converges a.s. (with probability one) to the centralized least squares
estimator θc
2.1.2 Bad Data Processing
In power system state estimation, bad data refers to measurements that have
large errors beyond typical confidence interval of random Gaussian noise. As an
important component of state estimation, bad data processing consists of two proce-
dures: detection and identification [43]. Bad data detection determines whether the
measurement set contains bad data. Then, bad data identification is subsequently
performed to find which measurements contain bad data. Representative methods
for bad data detection and identification are the Chi-squares test and the Largest
Normalized Residual Test. They are briefly explained as follows:
2.1.2.1 Chi-squares Test
Consider the estimation objective function
J(x̂) = rTR−1r (2.14)
where r = z−h(x̂) is defined as the estimated residual vector. Since the measurement
errors are normally distributed, the estimated objective function J(x̂) obeys a chi-
square distribution withm-n degrees of freedom, i.e., J(x̂)∼χ2m−n. m and n represent
the number of measurements and state variables, respectively. Therefore, bad data
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will be detected if
J(x̂) ≥ χ2(m−n),p (2.15)
where p is the detection confidence probability.
2.1.2.2 The Largest Normalized Residual Test
We consider the linearized measurement model. Normalized residuals are used for
identifying bad data after state estimation is performed. The measurement residual
vector r could be represented as
r = z−Hθ = Se (2.16)
where the residual sensitivity matrix S represents the relationship between the mea-
surement residuals and the measurement errors:
S = I−HGHTR−1 (2.17)
where we define the gain matrix G = HTR−1H. Therefore, normalized residual
vector can be represented as
rN =
|r|√
diag(SR)
. (2.18)
If the measurement corresponding to the largest normalized residual is greater than
a chosen identification threshold, that measurement is considered as bad data and is
eliminated for another round of state estimation.
Conventionally bad data processing, along with other functions of state estima-
tion, is performed at one control center. More recently the possibility of decentralized
bad data processing has been exploited for the purpose of WAMPAC. A two-level
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distributed bad data processing is discussed in [48, 56, 57]. The local level and co-
ordination level are in charge of filtering local and boundary bad data, respectively.
The first attempt for fully distributed bad data processing is presented in [58], which
introduces the concept of error residual spread area. Measurement error spreads
only to measurement residuals within error residual spread area. In other words,
no measurement error in one error residual spread area contaminates measurement
residuals in the other error residual spread areas. In this error residual spread area
setting, a reduced model for distributed bad data processing was proposed in [59].
Independent bad data processing is performed for each error residual spread area
by the existing bad data detection and identification techniques. A fully distributed
bad data detection and identification scheme with distributed state estimator was
proposed based on error residual area decomposition [60]. A heuristic measurement
design algorithm for information exchange between local areas was proposed in [61].
By exchanging local measurements or estimates with neighboring local areas, each
local area could achieve improved performance of bad data processing.
However, the aforementioned work of distributed bad data processing is primarily
based on error residual spread decomposition. For a large-scale power system, the
decomposition of administrative areas are typically not overlapped with the error
residual spread decomposition. The research challenge is to design the information
exchange scheme among administrative control areas so that through communication,
a distributed bad data detection and identification scheme becomes possible. In [62],
fully distributed bad data processing is formulated. This formulation is tailored for
the natural decomposition of an interconnected power system based on administra-
tive boundaries (e.g., New England and New York). In addition, an information
exchange scheme is proposed for detecting and identifying bad data in a distributed
manner, which requires minimum communication among the control areas. For an
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error residual spread area m, the local measurement Jacobian matrix is denoted by
Hm. It is proven in [59] that the residual sensitivity matrix S ordered based on error
residual spread areas exhibits block diagonal structure. Namely, the measurement
error in error residual spread area m does not contaminate any measurement outside
of area m. Moreover, the block matrix Sm is expressed as
Sm = Im −Hm[Gm]−1HTmR−1m (2.19)
Using (2.19), normalized residual vector in mth error residual spread area is defined
as
rN
m
=
|rm|√
diag(SmRm)
(2.20)
where rN
m
is the normalized residual vector at mth error residual spread area. [Gm]
−1
is the inverse of the sub-block gain matrix corresponding to the mth error residual
spread area. Note that the computation of Gm requires the knowledge from only
mth error residual spread area. If the error residual spread area decomposition
coincide with the administrative area decomposition, then each control area only
needs to conduct an independent bad data processing without considering the impact
of bad data from other areas. However, in most real-world power systems, the two
decomposition does not overlap with each other. Therefore, data communication
would be required among the administrative areas to conduct satisfactory bad data
processing. A simple information exchange scheme is proposed for detection and
identification of bad measurement data in [62].
2.1.3 Topology Error Processing
In comparison with bad data processing taking into account the detection and
identification of errors in continuous data such as the power injection/flow and volt-
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age/current magnitude, topology error processing filters the erroneous discrete data
such as the on/off status of a circuit breaker (CB).
Topology processor transforms a bus/section detailed model into a bus/branch
model using the status data of CB collected through SCADA system. The con-
structed bus/branch model is then utilized by major EMS applications such as state
estimator, contingency analysis, optimal power flow and security constrained eco-
nomic dispatch. However, due to the malfunction of CB, unreported CB mainte-
nance and human operation error the incorrect status data of CB is often fed into
topology processor, thus generating the wrong network topology. Topology error can
be categorized into the following two types of errors [43]:
• Line status error: the wrongly reported CB status data related to a transmis-
sion line generate two types of line status errors: line inclusion and exclusion
error. They correspond to the incorrect line inclusion and exclusion, respec-
tively.
• Substation configuration error: the wrongly reported CB status data in a sub-
station generate two types of substation configuration errors: bus split and
merging error. They correspond to the incorrect bus split and merging due to
the incorrect link between bus sections, respectively.
Fig. 2.2 illustrates these two types of topology errors in a two-bus system.
The problem for detecting topological errors in power systems was first addressed
in [63]. The method for checking topology status at substation level was proposed
in [64], based on linear programming with the variables of power flow estimate
through CBs. In [65], it was shown that line topology errors can be detected and
identified using a geometrically based test. In [66], the largest normalized residual
test was employed to handle bus split error as well as line errors. A correlation index
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Figure 2.2: Branch status error and substation configuration error.
that explains the relationship between topology error and suspected digital measure-
ment set was proposed in [67]. In [68], a modified two stage least absolute value
(LAV) state estimator was developed, identifying substation configuration and line
errors at the first and second stage, respectively. Computation-effective schemes for
topology error processing were developed based on reduced model [69] and implicit
model [70] to reduce the size of substation model for the least possible cost.
Topology error processing for line status error is conducted using measurement
residual analysis similar to bad data processing. We consider a linearized DC power
flow measurement model:
z = Jx + e (2.21)
where x is the state vector of the entire power system, z is measurement vector, e
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is independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random measurement error
vector with zero mean and covariance matrix R, and J is the true system Jacobian
matrix of the state vector x. For line status error, the measurement equation (2.21)
is rewritten as
z = JEx+ Ex+ e
where J = JE+E. Here, JE is the incorrect system Jacobian matrix due to topology
errors. E is the system Jacobian error matrix. The measurement residual vector is
expressed as
r = z− JExˆ = (I−KE)Mf (2.22)
and the statistical properties of r are described in terms of
E(r) = (I−KE)Ex (2.23)
Cov(r) = (I−KE)R (2.24)
Then, topology error detection is performed using the normalized residual vector as
follows:
E(rN) = Ω−
1
2 (I−KE)Mf = Sf
H1
≷
H0
η (2.25)
whereM is the measurement-to-branch incidence matrix, f is a vector of branch flow
errors, KE = JE(JE
TR−1JE)
−1JE
TR−1, Ω = diag{Cov(r)}, S = Ω− 12 (I −KE)M is
the sensitivity matrix for rN with respect to branch flow errors f , and η is the
threshold of topology error detection. H1 and H0 correspond to the cases with and
without topology error, respectively. On the other hand, topology error processing
for substation configuration error is initially carried out using an augmented set
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of measurement equations in terms of the state variables and the CB power flows.
However, since this method use the whole set of substations in full detailed model
it can increase computation complexity. Recently, reduced model [69] and implicit
model [70] are proposed to decrease computation complexity with much reduced
number of state variables.
2.2 Real-Time Power Market
In deregulated electricity markets, the nodal price at each bus is computed by
RTOs. The electric power market consists of two-settlement system, day-ahead mar-
ket and real-time spot market. Day-ahead market is often called as a forward market
where clearing optimal generation output and prices at every hour are calculated for
each hour of the next operation day based on generation offers, demand bids and
scheduled bilateral transactions. Real-time spot market is a spot market where prices
are calculated at every five minute based on the actual grid operation conditions.
The spot electricity nodal prices are obtained as the by-product of SCED. Based
on the industry practice, SCED is usually conducted using a linear DCOPF-based
model via linear programming (LP) due to the robustness of convergence and fast
computation time of LP [33]. There are two representative pricing models for SCED:
Ex-ante (e.g. in ERCOT, NY ISO) and Ex-post (e.g. in ISO New England, PJM, and
Midwest ISO). In ex-ante pricing model, SCED is carried out every 10 to 15 minute
prior to real time grid operation in order to determine the optimal generation output
and nodal price while satisfying the balance of supply and demand and operational
constraints. In ex-post pricing model, only prices are calculated by SCED at every
five minute based on the actual system condition for settlement purposes.
On the other hand, the real-time spot market can be operated by two types of
economic dispatch methods: static dispatch and look-ahead dispatch. The former
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computes the optimal dispatch for the current operating interval whereas the latter
calculates the optimal dispatch solution over multiple future time intervals. Fig. 2.3
illustrates a diagram of two-settlement electricity market operation including the
conceptual difference of look-ahead and static dispatch methods.
… 
Hour(j) Day(k-1) Day(k) 
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Figure 2.3: Electricity market operation.
2.2.1 Ex-Ante Market
In ex-ante real-time pricing models, the optimal generation output and LMP are
computed before the actual deployment of dispatch orders. For the system operator,
the Ex-ante dispatch is formulated as follows:
min
Pgi
∑
i∈G
Ci(Pgi) (2.26)
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s.t.
∑
i∈G
Pgi =
N∑
n=1
Dn (2.27)
Pˆmingi ≤ Pgi ≤ Pˆmaxgi ∀i ∈ G (2.28)
Fminl ≤ Fl ≤ Fmaxl ∀l = 1, . . . , L (2.29)
where
Pˆmaxgi = min{Pmaxgi , Pˆgi(z) +Ri∆T} (2.30)
Pˆmingi = max{Pmingi , Pˆgi(z)− Ri∆T}. (2.31)
In this formulation, the objective function is to minimize the total generation
costs in (2.26). (2.27) is the system-wide energy balance equation. (2.28) is the
physical capacity constraints of each generator embedded with its ramp constraints.
(2.29) is the transmission line constraints. It should be noted from (2.30) and (2.31)
that the physical capacity limits of each generator depend on the state estimation
result based on sensor measurement z. The calculated optimal dispatch is then
allocated to corresponding market participant such as generation company and load
serving entity.
2.2.2 Ex-Post Market
In ex-post real-time pricing models, LMPs are computed after the fact using real-
time estimates for settlement purposes. Assuming no demand elasticity, the Ex-post
dispatch is written as:
min
Pgi
∑
i∈G
Ci(Pgi) (2.32)
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s.t.
∑
i∈G
∆Pgi = 0 (2.33)
∆Pmingi ≤ ∆Pgi ≤ ∆Pmaxgi ∀i ∈ G (2.34)
∆Fl ≤ 0 ∀l ∈ CL+ (2.35)
∆Fl ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ CL− (2.36)
where
∆Pgi = Pgi − Pˆgi(z), ∆Fl = Fl − Fˆl(z)
CL+ = {l : Fˆl(z) ≥ Fmaxl }, CL− = {l : Fˆl(z) ≤ Fminl }
and ∆Pmaxgi and ∆P
min
gi
are usually chosen to be 0.1MWh and -2MWh, respectively.
In comparison with ex-ante pricing model, ex-post pricing model relies on the state
estimation result more.
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3. MALICIOUS TEMPORAL DATA ATTACK ON TIME-COUPLED
LOOK-AHEAD DISPATCH∗
3.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure (e.g., the electricity grid) has been facing an increasing
number of potential cyber attacks. Given the much stronger coupling between cyber
and physical layers of smart grid, development of cyber security technology tailored
for smart grid is of paramount importance.
The main objective of this section is to study the impact of cyber attacks on
state estimation, which subsequently influence the result of the newly emerging look-
ahead dispatch model in the real-time electricity market. Figs. 3.1(a),(b) illustrate
the information flow in a three-layered framework (with physical, measurement, and
control/computation layer) without and with such cyber attacks, respectively. The
information includes the physical state such as the nodal power injection and flow
and the dispatch instruction such as the optimal generation output and nodal price.
Compared to Fig. 3.1(a), Fig. 3.1(b) describes that bad/malicious data injected into
the measurement layer can lead to corrupted estimation of the states of the phys-
ical layer. Consequently, the attacker could distort the feedback information from
control/communication layer back to the physical layer in two ways, leading to (1)
physical insecurity in the power grid operations, and/or (2) financial misconduct in
the power markets as shown in Fig. 3.1(b). This section contributes to topic (2)
using a more realistic dispatch model in power markets.
In this section we present a new type of potential cyber attacks in more realistic
∗ c©2013 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from D.-H. Choi, and L. Xie, “Ramp-Induced Data
Attacks on Look-Ahead Dispatch in Real-Time Power Markets”, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1235-1243, September 2013.
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Figure 3.1: A three-layered framework illustrating cyber data attack.
economic dispatch model, i.e., look-ahead dispatch. Motivated by the increasing pen-
etration of variable resources such as wind and solar, look-ahead dispatch has been
implemented by major Independent System Operators (ISOs)/Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) in the past few years in order to improve the market dispatch
efficiency. Look-ahead dispatch is different from conventional static dispatch in that
it calculates the optimal dispatch in an extended period of time, taking into account
inter-temporal ramp rates of generators of different technologies. In this section, an
attack strategy is demonstrated, in which the attacker could withhold generation
capacity for financial gain by stealthily manipulating the ramp constraint limits of
generators in look ahead dispatch. It should be noted that the proposed attack strat-
egy is different from the capacity withholding methods used for a generation company
to report capacity noticeably lower than its maximum capacity based on learning al-
gorithm (e.g., SA-Q-Learning algorithm) [71, 72]. In contrast, the proposed method
is to inject undetectable malicious data into sensors in order to withhold capacity for
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financial misconduct in real-time markets. The main contributions of this paper are
two-fold:
1. We formulate a malicious ramp-induced data (RID) attack problem in look-
ahead dispatch. The attacker could stealthily change the ramp constraint limits
of generators through manipulating sensors’ data, aiming at increasing the
nodal price by withholding capacity of generator.
2. We propose a RID attack strategy with which the attacker could make a profit
without being detected by RTOs in the real-time electricity market. Numerical
examples are illustrated in the IEEE-14 bus system.
Following this introductory section, the rest of Section 3 is structured as follows.
Section 3.2 provides the brief overview of DC state estimation and real-time power
market with look-ahead dispatch model. Section 3.3 overview spatial data attack
on static economic dispatch in ex-post pricing model. Two types of profitable and
undetectable attack strategies based on virtual bidding mechanism are formulated,
which lead to the distortion of ex-post LMPs. Section 3.4 states the proposed ramp-
induced data attack problem in real-time power markets with look-ahead dispatch.
The required attack conditions, attack procedure and strategy, and attack perfor-
mance metrics are elaborated in more detail in Section 3.5, which is followed by
illustrative examples based on the IEEE 14-bus test system in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
The notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 DC State Estimation Model
We consider the scenario in which the adversary attacks the linearized DC state
estimation model. As shown in (2.8), DC state estimation model normally includes
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the bus voltage phase angle θ as the system state. Given a fixed topology and choice
of slack bus, there exists a bijective relationship between bus voltage phase angle
and the vector of nodal power injection x. Since the LMPs are explicitly calculated
from nodal power injections, the states in this section is defined as the vector of
nodal power injection x. Therefore, the linearized DC state estimation measurement
model is rewritten as follows:
z = Hx+ e =
 I
Hd
x+ e, (3.1)
where
x: state vector (nodal power injections)
z: measurement vector (power injection and flow measurements)
e: independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian measurement error vector
following N (0,R)
H: the system factor matrix specifying the relationship between x and z.
Here the matrixH is concatenated with two submatrices, Hd and I, which denote
the distribution factor matrix and the identity matrix, respectively.
The state estimation problem is to find the optimal estimate of x to minimize
the weighted least square of measurement error:
minimize J(x) = rTR−1r (3.2)
s.t. r = z−Hx, (3.3)
where r is the estimated residual vector. If the system is observable (i.e., the system
factor matrix H is full rank), the unique weighted least squares estimate of x is given
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by
xˆ(z) = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z = Bz. (3.4)
Table 3.1: Notations.
i Index for generators i
n Index for buses n
l Index for transmission line l
K Total number of sampling period
N Total number of buses
L Total number of transmission lines
M Total number of measurements
G Set of generation units
GM Set of marginal units
GcM Set of binding units with lower marginal cost
than marginal unit
G
c
M Set of binding units with higher marginal cost
than marginal unit
D Set of demands
Dˆn[k] nth bus fixed demand at time k
Pgi [k] Scheduled ith generator power at time k
Fl[k] Transmission flow at line l at time k
Ri Ramp rate of generator i
∆T Dispatch interval
Pmingi , P
max
gi
Min/max generation limits for generator i
Fminl , F
max
l Min/max flow limits at line l
3.2.2 Look-Ahead Dispatch Model
The electric power market consists of two-settlement system, day-ahead and real-
time spot markets. Recently, due to limited predictability in day-ahead and high
inter-temporal variability of renewable resources (e.g., wind and solar), RTOs are
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upgrading real-time market clearing engine from static dispatch to look-ahead dis-
patch models for more flexible operations in support of high penetration of variable
resources. For the system operator, look-ahead dispatch is formulated as follows,
min
Pgi [k]
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
Ci(Pgi[k]) (3.5)
s.t.
∑
i∈G
Pgi[k] =
N∑
n=1
Dˆn[k] ∀k = 1, . . . , K (3.6)
|Pgi[k]− Pgi[k − 1]| ≤ Ri∆T ∀k = 1, . . . , K (3.7)
Pmingi ≤ Pgi[k] ≤ Pmaxgi ∀k = 1, . . . , K (3.8)
Fminl ≤ Fl[k] ≤ Fmaxl ∀k = 1, . . . , K. (3.9)
In this formulation, the objective function is to minimize the total generation costs
in (3.5). (3.6) is the system-wide energy balance equations. (3.7) and (3.8) are the
ramp constraints and the physical capacity constraints of each generator, respectively.
(3.9) is the transmission line constraints. In this section, we define one-step look-
ahead dispatch with K = 1 as static dispatch. The Lagrangian function of the
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aforementioned look-ahead dispatch is written as
L =
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
Ci(Pgi[k])−
K∑
k=1
λ[k]
[∑
i∈G
Pgi[k]−
N∑
n=1
Dˆn[k]
]
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
[ωi,max[k](Pgi [k]− Pgi[k − 1]−Ri∆T )]
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
[ωi,min[k](Pgi[k − 1]− Pgi[k]−Ri∆T )]
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
[
τi,max[k](Pgi [k]− Pmaxgi )
]
+
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈G
[
τi,min[k](P
min
gi
− Pgi[k])
]
+
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
[µl,max[k](Fl[k]− Fmaxl )]
+
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
[
µl,min[k](F
min
l − Fl[k])
]
,
where all the Lagrangian multipliers at time k (λ[k], ωi,max[k], ωi,min[k], τi,max[k],
τi,min[k], µl,max[k], and µl,min[k]) are positive. According to the definition of the
nodal price [73], and assuming that bus 1 is the slack bus, the locational marginal
price (LMP) for each bus n (n = 2, . . . , N) at time k is given by
λn[k] = λ[k]−HdTn (µmax[k]− µmin[k]), (3.10)
where λ[k] is the LMP for the slack bus 1 at time k, Hd
n
= [ ∂F1
∂Dˆn
, . . . , ∂FL
∂Dˆn
]T , µmax[k] =
[µ1,max[k], . . . , µL,max[k]]
T , and µmin[k] = [µ1,min[k], . . . , µL,min[k]]
T .
Alternatively, by the first-order KKT condition of look-ahead dispatch formula-
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tion, the LMP for each generator i connected to bus n is written as
λi[k] =
∂Ci(Pgi[k])
∂Pgi [k]
−HdT
n
(µmax[k]− µmin[k])
+ (τi,max[k]− τi,min[k]) + (ωi,max[k]− ωi,max[k + 1]1A[k])
+ (ωi,min[k + 1]1A[k]− ωi,min[k]) , (3.11)
where 1A[k] is the indicator function based on the set A = {1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1}. In
other words, 1A[k]=1 when k∈A, otherwise (i.e., k∈Ac = {k = K}) 1A[k]=0. We
can observe from (3.11) that the Lagrangian multipliers, ωi,max[k+1] and ωi,min[k+1],
corresponding to the ramp constraints at the future time k + 1 influence the LMPs
calculation at the current time k. However, the LMP formulation in static dispatch
(one-step look-ahead) does not capture future constraints.
3.3 Overview of Spatial Data Attack on Static Dispatch
In this section, we overview the problem of false data injection attack on static
dispatch in ex-post pricing model [24]. A key result is to develop a profitable and
undetectable attack strategy in which the attacker uses virtual bidding mechanism
to result in consistent financial arbitrage between day-ahead and ex-post real-time
prices at selected pairs of nodes.
3.3.1 Ex-Post LMP Formulation
From ex-post pricing formulation in Subsection 2.2.2, the Lagrangian of this
formulation is defined as
L =
∑
i∈G
Ci(Pgi)− λ
∑
i∈G
∆Pgi +
∑
i∈G
µi,max
(
∆Pgi −∆Pmaxgi
)
+
∑
i∈G
µi,min
(
∆Pmingi −∆Pgi
)
+
∑
l∈CL+
ηl∆Fl +
∑
l∈CL−
ζl (−∆Fl) (3.12)
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where all Lagrangian multipliers positive or equal to zero. We define ηl = 0 if
l 6∈ CL+, ζl = 0 if l 6∈ CL−. Then, the nodal price at each bus n (n = 2, . . . , N) is
given by
λn = λ+
L∑
l=1
(ηl − ζl) ∂Fl
∂Dn
. (3.13)
We can write (3.13) in a matrix form. Let us define η = [η1, . . . , ηL]
′
and ζ =
[ζ1, . . . , ζL]
′
. Since ∂Fl/∂Dn = H
d
ln where H
d
ln is the element on the lth row and nth
column of Hd, (3.13) can be rewritten as
λn = λ+H
dT
n
(η − ζ) , (3.14)
where Hd
n
is the nth column of Hd matrix. Then, the price gap at two nodes n1 and
n2 is expressed as
λn1 − λn2 =
(
Hd
n1
−Hd
n2
)T
(η − ζ) . (3.15)
3.3.2 Attack Model and Undetectability
We consider the additive attack measurement model:
za = Hx+ e + a, (3.16)
where a is the attack vector, which leads to the corrupted measurement vector za.
The new residual vector ra can be decomposed into two terms, corresponding to
without and with attack, respectively:
ra = r+ (I−HB)a (3.17)
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, and by triangular inequality of the L2-norm || · ||2,
||ra||2 = ||r+ (I−HB)a||2
≤ ||r||2 + ||(I−HB)a||2 < η,
(3.18)
where η is the bad data detection threshold. For bypassing the bad data detection
algorithm, the attacker aims at constructing the attack vector a so that the value of
||(I−HB)a||2 added to ||r||2 still makes the above undetectable condition hold true.
3.3.3 Attack Procedure Using Virtual Bidding Mechanism
The attacker is assumed to exploit the virtual bidding mechanism for making a
profit. In some RTOs, virtual bidding activities are legitimate financial instruments
in electricity markets with some advantages such as mitigation of supplier market
power and market efficiency improvement due to the convergence of the prices in day-
ahead and real-timer markets. A market participant purchase/sell a certain amount
of virtual power at location in day-ahead forward market and sell/purchase the exact
same amount of power in the subsequent real-time market. The attack procedure
exploiting virtual bidding mechanism can be summarized as follows:
Step 1) In day-ahead forward market, the attacker buys and sells virtual power Pv
at buses n1 and n2 with day-ahead prices λ
DA
n1
and λDAn2 , respectively.
Step 2) The attacker injects the malicious attack vector a into sensor measurement
vector z to manipulate the nodal price of ex-post market. Therefore, the
corrupted measurement vector za is written as za = z+ a.
Step 3) In ex-post real-time market, the attacker again sells and buys virtual power
Pv at buses n1 and n2 at real-time prices λn1 and λn2 , respectively.
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Therefore, the profit obtained through this virtual trading transaction is written as
Profit =
(
λn1 − λDAn1
)
Pv +
(
λDAn2 − λn2
)
Pv = (λn1 − λn2 + λDAn2 − λDAn1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
)Pv. (3.19)
In (3.19), the following p is defined as a profit signal
p = λn1 − λn2 + λDAn2 − λDAn1 . (3.20)
Using (3.15), (3.20) changed by a malicious data injection can be written as
p(za) =
(
Hd
n1
−Hd
n2
)T
(η(za)− ξ(za)) + λDAn2 − λDAn1 . (3.21)
It should be noted that Lagrangian multipliers η(za) and ξ(za) are manipulated by
corrupted measurement vector za.
3.3.4 Attack Strategy
In this subsection, two cases are considered where the subset of compromised
sensors is fixed and only a limited number of measurement sensors could be compro-
mised.
Case I: predetermined subset of compromised sensors
The goal of the attacker is to find a profitable input a when the subset of compro-
mised sensors is fixed. Let us define the set
L+ = {l : Hdln1 > Hdln2}, L− = {l : Hdln1 < Hdln2}.
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Then, p(za) can be decomposed into
p(za) =
∑
l∈L+
(
Hdln1 −Hdln2
)
(ηl(za)− ζl(za)) (3.22)
+
∑
l∈L−
(
Hdln2 −Hdln1
)
(ζl(za)− ηl(za)) + λDAn2 − λDAn1 .
By the fact that ηl(ζl) is nonnegative and it is 0 if the line is not congested, the
sufficient conditions for p(za) > 0 are as follows:
(C1) λDAn2 > λ
DA
n1
.
(C2) Fˆ
′
l < F
max
l if l ∈ L−.
(C3) Fˆ
′
l > F
min
l if l ∈ L+.
The attacker could satisfy (C1) easily in the day-ahead market. That is, the attacker
knows day-ahead prices at specific buses. The attacker needs to change the mea-
surement in order to make sure that (C2) and (C3) hold true. We give the following
definition:
Definition 1. An attack input a is called δ-profitable if the following inequalities
hold
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≤ Fmaxl − δ, ∀l ∈ L−, (3.23)
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≥ Fminl − δ, ∀l ∈ L+, (3.24)
where E[Fˆ
′
l ] = F
∗ +HdBa and F ∗ is the result of the ex-ante dispatch.
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Therefore, the attacker’s strategy is to find an  feasible a such that the margin
δ is maximized. The attack method can be formulated as
max
a∈span(A)
δ (3.25)
s.t.
||(I−HB)a||2 ≤  (3.26)
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≤ Fmaxl − δ, ∀l ∈ L−, (3.27)
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≥ Fminl − δ, ∀l ∈ L+, (3.28)
δ > 0 (3.29)
where the set A represents the attack vector space, which describes the attack pat-
tern related to the type and number of compromised sensors. We can see from the
above optimization problem that the objective function and all the constraints are
convex. Therefore, this problem is a convex programming problem and can be solved
efficiently.
Case II: limited resources to compromise sensors
We consider a case where the attacker is able to choose the set of sensors to com-
promise. However, since the attacker has limited capabilities, the total number of
compromised sensors cannot exceed certain threshold κ. Consequently, the attacker
need to construct an optimal attack vector to system and to choose the optimal set
of sensors to compromise at the same time.
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To this end, we can write the optimization problem as
max
a∈span(A)
δ (3.30)
s.t.
||(I−HB)a||2 ≤  (3.31)
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≤ Fmaxl − δ, ∀l ∈ L−, (3.32)
E[Fˆ
′
l ] ≥ Fminl − δ, ∀l ∈ L+, (3.33)
δ > 0 (3.34)
||a||0 ≤ κ, (3.35)
Here, || · ||0 implies the zero norm, which is defined as the number of nonzero elements
in a vector. The nonzero elements of a correspond to the sensors the attacker wishes
to compromise. In this formulation we note that a does not necessarily lie in the
span of A, but instead a must have no more than κ nonzero elements.
3.4 Statement of Temporal Data Attack Problem
A general problem of cyber attack against state estimation in economic dispatch
can be illustrated in statistical signal processing framework in Fig. 3.2. It provides a
graphical interpretation for the relationship among sensor’s measurement, state esti-
mation, and economic dispatch. The state set S is partitioned into a finite number of
nodal price subsets λi[1]. The operation of economic dispatch is implicitly included
in the state set S. The measurement space M is the collection of all realizable
sensor’s measurements z. The set of probability measure µ provides a mathematical
basis for describing the randomness of measurements. In the power system state
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estimation literature, the probability measure normally follows the Gaussian distri-
bution. These random measurement errors can be filtered by the existing bad data
processing algorithm. The objective of the attacker is to move the estimate from a
certain nodal price subset to a desired nodal price subset by corrupting original mea-
surements z into za while avoiding the bad data detection. Detailed attack model
and formulation are described in Section 3.5.
?1[1] 
?2[1] ?3[1] 
?4[1] 
?5[1] 
?5[1] ?6[1] 
?7[1] 
?8[1] µx 
z 
State  Set   S Set  of  Probability  Measure Measurement  Space  M 
X[0] 
X[0] 
Estimate Probability Law Realization 
za 
µ 
Figure 3.2: Statistical signal processing framework illustrating the relationship
among sensor data, state estimation, and economic dispatch.
In the above framework, a potential cyber attack in look-ahead dispatch is de-
scribed as follows. The ith unit’s initial generation power Pgi[0] embedded in (3.7)
is replaced, at every dispatch interval, by its corresponding estimate Pˆgi(z), which
is processed and delivered by the state estimator. Therefore, in static dispatch the
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generation power of unit i at k = 1 becomes bounded by
Pmaxgi [1] = min{Pmaxgi , Pmaxgi,R (z)} (3.36)
Pmingi [1] = max{Pmingi , Pmingi,R (z)}, (3.37)
where the maximum and minimum limits of the ramp constraints, Pmaxgi,R (z) and
Pmingi,R (z), are
Pmaxgi,R (z) = Pˆgi(z) +Ri∆T, P
min
gi,R
(z) = Pˆgi(z)−Ri∆T. (3.38)
If the attacker manipulates the estimate Pˆgi(z) by injecting false data into z so that
the capacity limits of unit i at k = 1 are binding to stealthily changed ramp constraint
limits, the optimal generation dispatch and nodal price might be miscalculated by
RTOs. In this section we define this type of attack as a ramp-induced data (RID)
attack in a potential class of malicious inter-temporal data attacks.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates the RID attack, which withholds capacity of a marginal unit
(a part-loaded generator). Left and right diagrams describe the generation charac-
teristics of the marginal unit without and with the attack, respectively. W is the
feasible range of generation limited by the ramp rate of the marginal unit, and ∆L
is an incremental (in this figure) or decremental system load from k = 0 to k = 1.
We note that as Pˆgi[0] (for simplicity, we omit z, instead emphasize the time) is ma-
nipulated by the attacker, ∆L can deviate, upwards or downwards, from the range
of W , leading to capacity withholding or capacity withdrawing, respectively. The
right diagram in Fig. 3.3 shows that if Pˆgi[0] is decreased to Pˆgi,a[0] by the attacker
at k = 0 so that ∆L deviates upwards from the range of W , the attacker succeeds
in withholding capacity, resulting in a new dispatch output Pˆ ∗gi,a[1] at k = 1. As
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Figure 3.3: Conceptual diagrams illustrating a ramp-induced data attack.
a result, the infra-marginal unit (the unit with the next higher marginal cost) is
dispatched to supply the excess demand, consequently leading to a uniformly higher
market price.
Remark 1. Define Pˆgi,a[0] − P ∗gi[0] as the contribution of the attacker to changing
the nodal price. The RID attack fails (i.e., the nodal price remains unchanged) if the
value of this contribution belongs to the following interval:
∆L−Ri∆T ≤ Pˆgi,a[0]− P ∗gi[0] ≤ ∆L+Ri∆T. (3.39)
The feasible region of Pˆgi[0] based on constraint (3.39) is defined as the price-invulnerable
region.
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3.5 Formulation of the Ramp-Induced Data Attack
3.5.1 Requirements and Procedure for a Successful RID Attack
From the analysis above, in order to implement a RID attack with profits, the
attacker is required to have the knowledge of
(R1) the system topology (e.g., distribution factor matrix), which remains constant
at every dispatch interval
(R2) the ramp rates of the targeted generators
(R3) the amount of changing system load between two consecutive dispatch intervals
The system topology for the targeted power system in Requirement (R1) can be sim-
ply obtained off-line by an internal intruder in a control center or estimated by linear
independent component analysis (ICA) technique proposed in [20]. For Requirement
(R2), typical ramp rates are estimable for typical generators. Requirement (R3) is
feasible since the attacker can estimate an amount of changing system load from
RTOs’ website. With these assumptions, the procedure of the proposed RID attack
is summarized as follows:
Step 1) The attacker synchronizes the attack time with the start time at every dis-
patch interval. This step is necessary for injected false data to mislead
economic dispatch via the state estimator.
Step 2) The attacker determines sensors to compromise and computes the attack
vector using the proposed attack strategy formulated in the next subsection.
Step 3) The attacker injects the attack vector into sensors’ measurements at the
attack time set in Step 1). Then, these corrupted measurements are trans-
mitted to the state estimator via SCADA network.
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Step 4) The state estimator based on received false measurements may lead to dis-
torted generation output estimates. They are utilized for setting the ramp
constraints in look-ahead dispatch.
Step 5) Consequently, the manipulated ramp constraints result in the attacker’s de-
sired dispatch instruction. Then, it is sent to the dispatchable generators.
Step 6) For the continuous attack, the procedure goes back to Step 2).
3.5.2 Proposed Attack Strategy
In this subsection we formulate a ramp-induced data attack strategy. The power
system is assumed to have sufficient transmission capacity. As the first step toward
understanding the impact of cyber attack on temporal ramp-constrained economic
dispatch, we exclude the impact of spatial transmission congestion on the market
clearning prices. In practice, temporal ramp constraints are coexisting with spatial
transmission flow constraints. Therefore, for a successful RID attack in congested
networks the attacker should know the targeted power system very well and as much
as the system operator knows, however this scenario is unrealistic. Developing a
feasible RID attack strategy in congested networks is beyond the scope of this paper
and referred to as a future work.
The proposed attacks are classified into the following three types:
• Marginal unit attack : a injection measurement sensor associated with the
marginal unit is compromised.
• Binding unit attack : injection measurement sensors associated with the binding
units are compromised.
• Coordinated attack : injection measurement sensors associated with the binding
units as well as the marginal unit are compromised.
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Here a binding unit represents two types of units: an intra-marginal unit with the
lower marginal cost or an infra-marginal unit with the higher marginal cost than a
marginal unit. Fig. 3.4 shows a conceptual diagram for a binding unit attack. The
following proposed attack strategy and simulation results focus on intra-marginal
unit attack belonging to binding unit attack.
Remark 2. When there is no network transmission congestion, it is well acknowl-
edged that static dispatch involves a single marginal unit and multiple binding units
that produce their minimum or maximum outputs. On the other hand, look-ahead
dispatch may involve multiple marginal units even if there is no congestion in the the
transmission network. In this paper the marginal unit attack is associated with the
marginal unit in static dispatch.
For achieving undetectability and profitability, the attacker computes the attack
vector a by compromising sensors i ∈ GM or j ∈ GcM , which is the solution of the
following optimization problem:
max
a∈span(A)
δ (3.40)
s.t.
||(I−HB)a||2 ≤  (3.41)
αCM(a) + βCB(a) ≤ ∆L− Ri∆T − δ (3.42)
δ > 0 (3.43)
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Figure 3.4: Conceptual diagrams illustrating a binding unit attack.
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where
CM(a) = Bia, CB(a) =
∑
j∈GcM
[Bja+Rj∆T ].
CM(a) and CB(a) are the contributions of the attacker to changing the nodal price,
corresponding to the marginal unit and binding unit attacks, respectively. In order to
derive these two types of the attack contribution terms, we define the contributions
of the marginal unit and binding unit attacks in the expected sense as
CM (a) = E[dMi (a)] (3.44)
CB(a) = E[dB(a)] (3.45)
where
d
(M)
i (a) = Pˆgi,a [0]− P ∗gi[0] (3.46)
d(B)(a) =
∑
j∈GcM
(Pˆgj,a[0] +Rj∆T − Pmaxgj [0]). (3.47)
Here, Pˆgi,a [0] is the manipulated estimate of generation power at generation bus i.
Then,
CM (a) = E[d(M)i (a)]
= E[Pˆgi,a[0]]− P ∗gi[0]
(a)
= E[Bi(Hx+ e + a)]− P ∗gi[0]
(b)
= Bia
(3.48)
where Bi is the row vector of matrix B, which corresponds to the injection mea-
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surement sensor of generator i. (a) follows from Pˆgi,a[0] = Biz. (b) follows from
BiH=[0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0] where 1 is the ith element of vector BiH and E[xi] ≈ P ∗gi[0]
together with E[e] = 0. Similarly,
CB(a) = E[d(B)(a)]
=
∑
j∈GcM
[E[Pˆgj,a [0]] +Rj∆T − Pmaxgj [0]]
=
∑
j∈GcM
[Bja+ P
∗
gj
[0] +Rj∆T − Pmaxgj [0]]
(c)
=
∑
j∈GcM
[Bja+Rj∆T ]
(3.49)
where (c) follows from P ∗gj [0] = P
max
gj
[0].
The set A represents the attack vector space, which describes the attack pattern
related to the type and number of compromised sensors. ∆L−Ri∆T is the minimum
amount of power which the attacker should reduce at k = 0 in order to withhold the
capacity of unit i at k = 1. Constraint (3.41) assures undetectability as the parameter
 is tuned with an appropriate value. Constraint (3.42) assures profitability since it
enables unit i to bind at the limit of the up-ramp constraint, leading to the increasing
nodal price. Therefore, the attacker aims to maximize the margin δ in order to make
a financial gain via capacity withholding with a high probability. The binary values
of α and β in (3.42) determine the following three types of attacks:
1. α = 1, β = 0: Marginal unit attack
2. α = 0, β = 1: Binding unit attack
3. α = 1, β = 1: Coordinated attack.
This optimization problem has the number of decision variables equal to the
number of compromised sensors and only three linear inequality constraints. In
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the proposed attack model, the number of decision variables (i.e., the number of
compromised sensors) would not increase significantly. This results from the fact that
the attacker wishes to compromise less sensors for reducing his effort and is sometimes
incapable of compromising most sensors if they are highly protected against the
cyber attacks. Therefore, with a modest number of decision variables and inequality
constraints the computational complexity of this problem is quite manageable. In
particular, since the proposed attack strategy is formulated in Linear Programming
(LP), it can be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf LP method even in a large-scale
system.
Remark 3. Compared to the capacity withholding mentioned above, capacity with-
drawing can benefit a load serving entity (LSE) by manipulating the down-ramp con-
straint limit. This type of the attack is feasible when constraint (3.42) is replaced
with
αCM(a) + βCB(a) ≥ ∆L+Ri∆T + δ (3.50)
where
CM(a) = Bia, CB(a) =
∑
j∈G
c
M
[Bja−Rj∆T ].
Remark 4. Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics of the RID attack, as well
as the spatial attack proposed in [24]. Specifically, we note the vulnerability index.
This quantifies the vulnerability of the targeted power system subject to each type of
attack. If variables ∆L and F antel (power flow at the Ex-ante market) become closer
to constants Ri∆T and F
max
l , respectively, the power system becomes more and more
vulnerable to both attacks.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between RID attack and spatial attack.
RID Attack Spatial Attack
Potential Attacker Generation Company Third Party
Bidding Method Generation Bidding Virtual Bidding
Market Structure RT (Time-coupled only) DA/RT
RT Pricing Model Ex-ante Ex-post
Line Congestion No Yes
Vulnerability Index ∆L−Ri∆T Fmaxl − F antel
Target Sensors Injection Sensors Flow Sensors
* RT: Real-time, DA: Day-ahead
3.5.3 Attack Performance Metrics
The performance of the proposed RID attack is evaluated using the following
performance metrics:
3.5.3.1 Attack Profitability
Assuming that the power injection measurement sensor at generator i is compro-
mised, we define the attack profit efficiency (PE) of generator i as the ratio of the
profit with attack to without attack:
PE(i) =
P ∗gi,a[1](λ
(a)
i − ci)
P ∗gi[1](λ
(b)
i − ci)
× 100 (%). (3.51)
Here,
(
λ
(a)
i , P
∗
gi,a
[1]
)
and
(
λ
(b)
i , P
∗
gi
[1]
)
are two pairs of the nodal price and optimal
generation dispatch with and without attack, respectively. ci is the marginal cost for
generator i.
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3.5.3.2 Attack Undetectability
The system operator normally performs the Chi-squares test for detecting bad
data in the measurements. Bad (or malicious) data will bypass if
J(xˆ) ≤ χ2(m−s),p := ηχ, (3.52)
where p is the detection confidence probability, and m and s represent the number
of measurements and state variables, respectively.
3.5.3.3 Attack Vulnerability
Since the measurement noise follows a Gaussian distribution, the manipulated
estimate of the state at generator i is also a Gaussian random variable
xˆi(za) ∼ N (P∗i [0] +Bia,BiRBTi ). (3.53)
The probability of the distorted estimate xˆi(za) being within the price-invulnerable
region defined in Remark 1 is expressed as in terms of Q(·) functions
Pi(a) = P(l(i) ≤ xˆi(za) ≤ u(i))
= Q(l(i))−Q(u(i)),
(3.54)
where the complementary Gaussian cumulative distribution function Q(x) is defined
as
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2pi
exp
(
−ξ
2
2
)
dξ (3.55)
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and
l(i) =
∆L− Ri∆T −Bia√
BiRBTi
(3.56)
u(i) =
∆L+Ri∆T −Bia√
BiRBTi
. (3.57)
We define Pi(a) as the price-invulnerable probability (PIP) with respect to generator
i. From (3.54), (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57), we specify the relationship among the ramp
rate Ri∆T , the diagonal measurement covariance matrix R, and the PIP as follows:
1. The increase of the Ri∆T leads to the increase of the PIP.
2. The decrease of the values of the diagonal elements in R leads to the increase
of the PIP.
In other words, the deployment of more accurate sensors and generators with a faster
ramp rate enables the power system to become more robust to the RID attack.
3.6 Numerical Example
In this section the economic impact of the proposed RID attack on the real-time
electricity market operation is illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system as shown in
Fig. 3.5. Measurement configuration includes nodal power injection measurements
at all generation and load buses, and power flow measurements at one end of each
transmission line. This system has a total of 34 measurements including 14 power
injection and 20 power flow measurements, which assure the system observability.
Table 3.3 shows the five generators’ operating characteristics, including unit type
(generation bus number), physical capacity limit, ramp rate and marginal cost (MC).
In a decongested power network where generators are set up with their marginal
costs and ramp rates, only the amount of changing system load between two consec-
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utive dispatch intervals (∆L) affects the proposed attack performance. Other factors
such as the size of network as well as the number and locations of generators do not
influence the feasibility of the attack. Therefore, our case study in the IEEE-14 bus
system is good enough to evaluate the performance of the proposed attacks.
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Figure 3.5: IEEE 14-bus test system with three attack cases.
In this section, three cases are simulated in the IEEE-14 bus system:
• Case I: Marginal unit attack.
• Case II: Binding unit attack.
• Case III: Coordinated attack.
The performance of the proposed RID attack is evaluated based on the one day
load profile with a 5-min resolution. This load profile is obtained by interpolating a
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Table 3.3: Generator parameters of the IEEE 14-bus test system.
Unit Type Pmin Pmax Ramp Rate MC
Coal(1) 0MW 200MW 10MW/5min 30$/MWh
Wind(2) 0MW 300MW 150MW/5min 20$/MWh
Nuclear(3) 0MW 300MW 8MW/5min 40$/MWh
Coal(6) 50MW 250MW 15 MW/5min 55$/MWh
Oil(8) 60MW 150MW 60 MW/5min 60$/MWh
15-min daily data in the ERCOT website. The load is scaled down to be consistent
with the IEEE 14-bus test system’s peak load data. The common goal of all three
cases is to withhold the capacity of generator 3 for the purpose of making a profit. A
power injection sensor at generation bus 3 is compromised in Case I whereas a power
injection sensor at generation 1 is compromised in Case II. Case III represents the
coordinated attack, which compromises both sensors targeted in Case I and Case II.
Figs. 3.6 show the comparison of the LMPs between static (K = 1) and look-
ahead dispatch (K = 6) without attack and with attack in Cases I, II and III.
Due to no network transmission congestion, the prices in these figures denote the
uniform LMPs for all the buses at every dispatch interval. In Fig. 3.6(a), the LMPs
in look-ahead dispatch are oscillating around 40$/MWh more than the ones in static
dispatch. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the binding of generator 3 at
the up- or down-ramp constraints at time k+1 makes its corresponding Lagrangian
multiplier, ω3,max[k+1] or ω3,min[k+1], become positive. As shown in equation (3.11),
this leads to different LMPs at time k than the ones from static dispatch. We observe
from Figs. 3.6(b),(c),(d) that the LMPs in both dispatch models tend to increase with
attack. This observation implies that the attacker successfully withholds the capacity
of generator 3 by lowering its up-ramp constraint limit through the reduction of the
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Figure 3.6: LMP of static and look-ahead dispatch without attack and with Case
I,II and III attacks.
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initial estimate Pˆg3,a[0]. Consequently, this leads to the shift of the marginal unit to
another one with a more expensive marginal cost.
Table 3.4: Attack performance in static and look-ahead dispatch.
Case Static (PE(3)) Look-ahead (PE(3)) J(ηχ = 37.6)
I 131.9 148.9 28.2
II 101.2 102.6 35.5
III 108.9 113.8 31.5
Table 3.5: Impact of ramp rate and measurement variance on the attack performance
in Case I.
Ramp Rate (MW/5min) Measurement Variance (σ2)
8 10 12 14 0.0005 0.005 0.05 0.5
Static (PE(3)) 131.9 119.7 106.4 100.5 123.2 129.1 130.3 136.9
Look-ahead (PE(3)) 148.9 123.5 108.5 103.1 143.5 144.75 146.1 152.8
PIP 0.017 0.021 0.037 0.044 0.056 0.041 0.034 0.021
Table 3.4 shows the attack performance of Cases I, II and III in both static and
look-ahead dispatch. The second and third columns of this table indicate the attack
profit efficiency at generation bus 3. We can observe from the comparison of these
two columns several facts. First, the PE values in all three cases of both dispatch
models are larger than 100. It indicates that the attacker makes an additional profit
using the proposed attack strategy. Second, for all three cases, the PE in look-ahead
dispatch is higher than in static dispatch. This observation might result from the fact
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that the attack leads to more increase of the nodal price in look-ahead dispatch than
in static dispatch. Lastly, among three cases, Case I and Case II attacks yield the
largest and smallest PE, respectively. The PE in Case III is between Case I and Case
II. This result is natural since Case II and Case III attacks require an extra effort
for withholding the binding unit’s capacity as well as the marginal unit’s capacity so
that both attacks fail with a higher probability than Case I attack.
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Figure 3.7: Pmaxg3 − P ∗g3 of static and look-ahead dispatch without attack and with
Case I,II and III attacks.
Fig. 3.7 shows the amount of generator 3’s capacity which all three attacks with-
hold between 80 and 90 time intervals. As expected, it is verified that Case I, Case
III, and Case II attacks withhold capacity the most in a descending order. This fact
also justifies the third observation mentioned above. The values of the estimated ob-
jective functions for all three cases are shown in the last column of Table 3.4. Based
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on the measurement configuration with m=34 and s=14, the threshold (ηχ) of the
Chi-squares test with a 99% confidence level is set to 37.6. For undetectability, the
parameter  in (3.41) is set to 3. Therefore, all three attacks in both dispatch models
succeed in avoiding the Chi-squares bad data detection.
Table 3.5 shows Case I attack performance with the varying ramp rate of gener-
ator 3 and measurement variance of sensors. We first observe from this table that
as the ramp rate of generator 3 increases the PE in both dispatch models decreases.
Another observation is that the decrease of measurement variance leads to the de-
crease of the attack profit. These observations imply that the nodal prices become
less manipulable, which is verified with the increasing PIP in Table 3.5.
Table 3.6: Attack performance with varying attack magnitude in Case I.
Attack Relative Magnitude (ARM %)
0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Static (PE(3)) 111.8 120.8 126.4 126.9
Look-ahead (PE(3)) 112.2 125.8 127.6 137.7
J 21.1 25.4 29.2 33.1
PIP 0.433 0.344 0.259 0.188
Table 3.6 shows the sensitivity of Case I attack performance with respect to the
attack magnitude. In this table, the attack relative magnitude (ARM) is defined as
||a||∞
||z||∞
× 100 where || · ||∞ denotes an infinity norm. We observe from this table that
the increase of the ARM leads to more profit (the third and fourth rows) in both
dispatch models. However, the estimated objective function J (the fifth row) used
for the Chi-squares bad data test increases and the PIP (the last row) decreases.
This implies that as the ARM increases the attack becomes more vulnerable to the
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bad data detection and fails with an increasing probability.
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4. LMP SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS TO DATA CORRUPTION-INDUCED
ESTIMATION ERROR∗
4.1 Introduction
State estimation is one of the key applications for power system energy manage-
ment systems (EMSs). The impact of bad data on power systems has been intensively
investigated in recent decades in power system state estimation literature. Measure-
ment noise and/or manipulated sensor errors in a supervisory control and data ac-
quisition (SCADA) system may mislead system operators about real-time conditions
in a power system, which in turn may impact the price signals in real-time power
markets. This section attempts to provide a novel analytical framework with which
to investigate the impact of bad sensor data on electric power market operations. In
future power system operations, which will probably involve many more sensors, the
impact of sensor data quality on grid operations will become increasingly important.
Locational marginal price (LMP) is the core variable in market operations [74]. In
real-time power markets, LMP is obtained as the by-product of security constrained
economic dispatch (SCED) in either of the two main pricing models: Ex-ante (e.g. in
ERCOT, NY ISO) and Ex-post (e.g. in ISO New England, PJM, and Midwest ISO).
Both pricing models are built on the power flow and network topology results given
by the state estimator, which uses two types of sensor data: 1) continuous (e.g., the
power injection/flow and voltage magnitude); and 2) discrete (e.g., the on/off status
of a circuit breaker).
∗ c©2013 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from D.-H. Choi and L. Xie, “Sensitivity Analysis
of Real-Time Locational Marginal Price to SCADA Sensor Data Corruption”, IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems with DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2013.2293634 and D.-H. Choi and L. Xie, “Impact
Analysis of Locational Marginal Price Subject to Power System Topology Errors”, 2013 Fourth
International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, October 2013.
62
Section 4 focuses on the impact of both continuous and discrete sensor data on
real-time LMP. Fig. 4.1 illustrates how the corrupted SCADA sensor data impact
the state estimation as well as the security constrained economic dispatch in energy
management systems (EMSs) and market management systems (MMSs). The two
lines (a) and (b) in Fig. 4.1 represent the flow of manipulated network topology
estimate and power flow estimate, corresponding to the corruption of discrete and
continuous data, respectively.
SCADA
Telemetry
Topology
Processor
Observability
Analysis
State
Estimation SCED 
Bad Data
Processing
Topology Error 
Processing
EMS MMS SCADA 
Impact flow of continuous data
Impact flow of discrete data
Data corruption
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.1: Illustrating the impact of corrupted continuous and discrete SCADA
sensor data on state estimation and SCED.
The main part of Section 4 is categorized into two sections. In Section 4.3, we
conduct the impact analysis of real-time LMP subject to power flow estimation error
due to continuous data corruption (dotted line (b) in Fig. 4.1). In Sections 4.4, we
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focus on investigating the impact of undetectable circuit breaker-induced network
topology errors on real-time LMP (dotted line (a) in Fig. 4.1).
Section 4.3 is motivated by a desire to study the effect of continuous data corrup-
tion on LMP via state estimation and provides an analytical framework for answering
the following questions:
1. How much does LMP change at every bus given a set of SCADA measurements
with corrupted continuous data?
2. What is the impact of continuous data accuracy on LMP sensitivity at each
bus?
Here, data corruption refers to both natural noise and man-made attacks. In this
section, we focus on a sensitivity analysis of real-time LMP in ex-ante and ex-post
pricing models subject to corrupted continuous data fed into the state estimator.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates that via state estimation, SCADA measurement z may impact the
results of a pair of Ex-ante nodal price and optimal generation dispatch {pi (xˆA(z)),
P ∗g (xˆA(z))} and the Ex-post price pi (xˆP (z)).
The novelty aspect of Section 4.3 is that it provides system operators with an
analytical tool for assessing the financial risks of bad/malicious data in light of secure
market operations. To this end, a unified LMP sensitivity matrix subject to data
corruption is developed, describing the coupling between LMP, the estimation of
power system states, and the sensor data. This matrix offers system operators an
online tool to: 1) quantify the impact of corrupted data at any sensor on LMP
variation at any bus; 2) identify buses with LMP highly sensitive to data corruption;
3) find significant and influential sensors with regards to LMP change; and 4) study
the effect of data accuracy on LMP sensitivity.
In Section 4.4, we derive a mathematical LMP sensitivity index that illustrates
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Figure 4.2: A three-layered framework illustrating the coupling of the physical power
system, state estimation, and SCED.
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the impact of power system topology error on LMP change. We assume that the
corruption in discrete data is not detected by topology error processing, thus leading
to undetectable topology change. Similar to the novelty in Section 4.3, the derived
LMP sensitivity index in Section 4.4 provides system operators with an analytical
tool to identify the most economically impacting transmission line/circuit breakers
on LMP as well as find the economically sensitive bus to topology error.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. We briefly review AC state
estimation and two representative real-time pricing models in Section 4.2. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we formulate the problem of LMP sensitivity analysis subject to continuous
data corruption, and derive such quantifying sensitivity metric. Using the derived
metric, we present numerical examples that illustrate the impact of different types
of SCADA sensors on LMP in IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems with both the
Ex-ante and Ex-post pricing models. Section 4.4 provides a LMP sensitivity index
with respect to network topology error. The derived sensitivity index is verified and
illustrated in the IEEE 14-bus system.
4.2 Preliminaries
The main notations used throughout this section are summarized in Table 4.1.
Bold symbols represent vectors or matrices. Hat symbols represent estimates of true
parameter value.
4.2.1 AC State Estimation Model
The measurement model for state estimation is formulated as
z = h(x) + e. (4.1)
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Table 4.1: Notations.
ai Linear cost coefficient for generator i
bi Quadratic cost coefficient for generator i
Ci(·) Energy cost for generator i
Pgi Scheduled generator power output for generator i
Ldi Fixed demand at bus i
Pmingi , P
max
gi
Min/max generation limits for generator i at Ex-ante dispatch
Fminl , F
max
l Min/max flow limits for transmission line l at Ex-ante dispatch
Sli Generation shift factor of transmission line l to bus i
∆Pmaxgi ,∆P
min
gi
Min/max incremental generation limits for generator i at Ex-post dispatch
Ri Ramp rate of generator i
∆T Dispatch interval
pii Locational marginal price at bus i
λ Shadow price of the system energy balance equation
τi Shadow price of the capacity constraint for generator i
µl Shadow price of the transmission line constraint for transmission line l
Nb Total number of buses
Nm Total number of sensor measurements
Nl Total number of transmission lines
CL+, CL− Sets of positively and negatively congested lines at Ex-ante dispatch
Sv Set of voltage magnitude measurements
Sri Set of real power injection measurements
Sai Set of reactive power injection measurements
Srf Set of real power flow measurements
Saf Set of reactive power flow measurements
Ik k × k identity matrix
1k, 0k k × 1 column vectors with all ones and all zeros, respectively
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Here z = [zTr z
T
a z
T
v ]
T is the Nm × 1 measurement vector that consists of real power
injection and the flow vector zr = [z
T
ri z
T
rf ]
T , the reactive power injection and flow
vector za = [z
T
ai z
T
af ]
T , and the bus voltage magnitude vector zv. x = [θ
T VT ]T is
the state vector that consists of the (Nb − 1) × 1 bus voltage phase angle vector θ
excluding a slack bus and the Nb×1 voltage magnitude vector V. h(x) is the Nm×1
nonlinear vector valued measurement function relating measurements to states, and
e is the Nm × 1 independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian measurement
error vector with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix R. The state estimator
computes the optimal estimate of x by minimizing the weighted least squares of
measurement error:
minimize J(x) = rTR−1r (4.2)
s.t. r = z− h(x). (4.3)
Using the Gauss-Newton method, the weighted least squares estimate vector xˆ is
computed by the following iterative procedure [43]:
∆xˆk+1 = [G(xˆk)]−1HT (xˆk)R−1∆zk (4.4)
where H(xˆk) =
[
∂h(xˆk)
∂xˆk
]
is the Nm× (2Nb−1) Jacobian matrix at k-th iteration, and
∆xˆk+1 = xˆk+1 − xˆk (4.5)
∆zk = z− h(xˆk) (4.6)
G(xˆk) = HT (xˆk)R−1H(xˆk). (4.7)
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The iteration process in (4.4) continues until the maximum of |∆xˆk| is less than a
predetermined threshold, otherwise stops and yields the ultimate estimates.
4.2.2 Real-Time Electricity Pricing Model
State estimation results impact real-time market operations. In this subsection,
we present two real-time pricing models based on the DCOPF model. For simplicity,
we assume that each bus has one generator and one load.
4.2.2.1 The Ex-ante Model
In ex-ante real-time market models, LMPs are computed before the actual deploy-
ment of dispatch orders. For the system operator, the Ex-ante dispatch is formulated
as follows:
min
Pgi
Nb∑
i=1
Ci(Pgi) (4.8)
s.t.
λ :
Nb∑
i=1
Pgi =
Nb∑
i=1
Ldi (4.9)
τ : Pˆmingi ≤ Pgi ≤ Pˆmaxgi ∀i = 1, . . . , Nb (4.10)
µ : Fminl ≤
Nb∑
i=1
Sli(Pgi − Ldi) ≤ Fmaxl ∀l = 1, . . . , Nl (4.11)
where
Pˆmaxgi = min{Pmaxgi , Pˆgi(z) +Ri∆T}
Pˆmingi = max{Pmingi , Pˆgi(z)− Ri∆T}.
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In this formulation, the objective function is to minimize the total generation costs
in (4.8). (4.9) is the system-wide energy balance equation. (4.10) is the physical
capacity constraints of each generator embedded with its ramp constraints. (4.11) is
the transmission line constraints.
4.2.2.2 The Ex-post Model
In ex-post real-time market models, LMPs are computed after the fact using real-
time estimates for settlement purposes. Assuming no demand elasticity, the Ex-post
dispatch is written as:
min
Pgi
Nb∑
i=1
Ci(Pgi) (4.12)
s.t.
λ :
Nb∑
i=1
Pgi =
Nb∑
i=1
Pˆgi(z) (4.13)
τ : Pˆmingi ≤ Pgi ≤ Pˆmaxgi ∀i = 1, . . . , Nb (4.14)
µmax :
Nb∑
i=1
Sli(Pgi − Ldi) ≤ Fˆl(z) ∀l ∈ CL+ (4.15)
µmin :
Nb∑
i=1
Sli(Pgi − Ldi) ≥ Fˆl(z) ∀l ∈ CL− (4.16)
where
Pˆmaxgi = Pˆgi(z) + ∆P
max
gi
, Pˆmingi = Pˆgi(z) + ∆P
min
gi
.
The above formulation is expressed with different notation than a general Ex-post
model in order to emphasize that the state estimation solution has a direct impact
on the Ex-post model.
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4.3 Impact Analysis of LMP Subject to Power Flow Estimate Errors
4.3.1 Problem Formulation
For all buses (i = 1, . . . , Nb) and measurements (j = 1, . . . , Nm), the Nb×1 vector
of LMPs can be expressed in a composite function form:
LMP = pi(xˆ(z))
where
pi = [pi1, pi2, . . . , piNb]
T (4.17)
pii = fi(xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆNm) (4.18)
xˆj = gj(z1, z2, · · · , zNm). (4.19)
pii represents the LMP at bus i. zj and xˆj are the measurement and its corresponding
estimate at sensor j, respectively. fi(·) is the vector function that describes the
relationship between any estimate and LMP at bus i. gj(·) is the vector function
that describes the relationship between any measurement and estimate at sensor j.
The primary goal of this section is to compute LMP sensitivity at any bus i
subject to a measurement change at any sensor j throughout the entire transmission
network.
∂pii
∂zj
= Λ(i,j). (4.20)
By chain rule, for all i and j, (4.20) is written as
∂pii
∂zj
=
∂pii
∂xˆ1
∂xˆ1
∂zj
+
∂pii
∂xˆ2
∂xˆ2
∂zj
+ · · ·+ ∂pii
∂xˆNm
∂xˆNm
∂zj
. (4.21)
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In (4.21), the estimate xˆj is chosen as an intermediate variable for computing the
partial derivative of pii with respect to zj . This variable is used to set the bounds
for: 1) minimum and maximum generation capacity in (4.10), (4.14); 2) the system
balance equation in (4.13); and 3) the positive and negative transmission line capacity
in (4.15), (4.16). Equation (4.21) can be expressed in matrix form as shown in (4.22).
Λ(Nb×Nm) =
∂pi
∂z
(4.22)
=
∂pi
∂xˆ
∂xˆ
∂z
=

∂pi1
∂xˆ1
∂pi1
∂xˆ2
· · · ∂pi1
∂xˆNm
∂pi2
∂xˆ1
∂pi2
∂xˆ2
· · · ∂pi2
∂xˆNm
...
...
. . .
...
∂piNb
∂xˆ1
∂piNb
∂xˆ2
· · · ∂piNb
∂xˆNm

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΛA

∂xˆ1
∂z1
∂xˆ1
∂z2
· · · ∂xˆ1
∂zNm
∂xˆ2
∂z1
∂xˆ2
∂z2
· · · ∂xˆ2
∂zNm
...
...
. . .
...
∂xˆNm
∂z1
∂xˆNm
∂z2
· · · ∂xˆNm
∂zNm

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΛB
.
The sensitivity Λ(i,j) in (4.20) is the element at the ith row and jth column of the
Nb × Nm sensitivity matrix Λ. The matrix Λ is written as the multiplication form
of two matrices with different types of sensitivities: the Nb × Nm matrix ΛA = ∂pi∂xˆ
quantifies the economic impact of any estimate on any LMP, and the Nm×Nm matrix
ΛB =
∂xˆ
∂z
quantifies the cyber impact of any sensor measurement on any estimate.
The derivations of ΛA and ΛB are described in more detail in the next subsection.
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4.3.2 LMP Sensitivity to Continuous Sensor Data Corruption
4.3.2.1 Sensitivity of LMPs to Estimated States
We first derive the sensitivity matrix ΛA using the Ex-ante model. To this end,
the perturbation approach developed in [32] is applied to the Ex-ante model in Sub-
section 4.2.2. The Lagrangian function of the Ex-ante dispatch is written as
L =
Nb∑
i=1
Ci(Pgi)− λ
(
Nb∑
i=1
[Pgi − Ldi ]
)
+
2Nb∑
j=1
τj
(
Nb∑
i=1
AjiPgi − Cˆj
)
+
2Nl∑
l=1
µl
(
Nb∑
i=1
Sli[Pgi − Ldi ]−Dl
)
where Aji, Sli, Cˆj and Dl are the elements of the following matrices
A(2Nb×Nb) =
[
Aji
]
=
 INb
−INb
 (4.23)
B(2Nl×Nb) =
[
Sli
]
=
 S
−S
 (4.24)
Cˆ(2Nb×1) =
[
Cˆj
]
=
 Pˆmaxg
−Pˆming
 (4.25)
D(2Nl×1) =
[
Dl
]
=
 Fmax
−Fmin
 . (4.26)
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Here, S is the generation shift factor matrix, and
Pˆmax(min)g = [Pˆ
max(min)
g1
, . . . , Pˆmax(min)gNb
]T (4.27)
Fmax(min) = [F
max(min)
1 , . . . , F
max(min)
Nl
]T . (4.28)
As in [32], unbinding inequality constraints are excluded in our sensitivity analysis.
Let us define Bg and Bf as the number of binding constraints associated with gen-
eration capacity and line capacity, respectively. Then, the KKT conditions of the
Ex-ante problem are written as
(i)
∂Ci(Pgi)
∂Pgi
− λ+
Bg∑
j=1
τjAji +
Bf∑
l=1
µlSli = 0
∀i = 1, . . . , Nb
(ii)
Nb∑
i=1
Pgi =
Nb∑
i=1
Ldi
(iii)
Nb∑
i=1
AjiPgi = Cˆj ∀j = 1, . . . , Bg
(iv)
Nb∑
i=1
Sli[Pgi − Ldi ] = Dl ∀l = 1, . . . , Bf .
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after which the above KKT equations are perturbed with respect to Pgi, Ldi , Cˆj, λ,
τj , and µj as follows:
(i)
∂
∂Pgi
(
∂Ci(Pgi)
∂Pgi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mi
dPgi − dλ+
Bg∑
j=1
Ajidτj
+
Bf∑
l=1
Slidµl = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , Nb
(ii)
Nb∑
i=1
dPgi =
Nb∑
i=1
dLdi
(iii)
Nb∑
i=1
AjidPgi = dCˆj ∀j = 1, . . . , Bg
(iv)
Nb∑
i=1
SlidPgi =
Nb∑
i=1
SlidLdi ∀l = 1, . . . , Bf .
It should be noted that the variables Dl, Aji, and Sli in the KKT equations are not
perturbed. This is due to the fact that 1) the limits of line flow constraint limits
in the Ex-ante model are not updated by the state estimator, and 2) the network
topology is not affected by corrupted analog data. These perturbation equations can
be expressed in matrix form:

M −1Nb Υ
1TNb 0 0
ΥT 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ

dPg
dλ
dτ s
dµs

=
[
U1
T U2
T
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
 dLd
dCˆs
 (4.29)
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where
M(Nb×Nb) = diag(M1, . . . ,MNb) (4.30)
Υ(Nb×[Bg+Bf ]) =
[
ATs B
T
s
]
(4.31)
U1(Nb×[Nb+1+Bg+Bf ]) =
[
0 1Nb 0 B
T
s
]
(4.32)
U2(Bg×[Nb+1+Bg+Bf ]) =
[
0 0Bg IBg 0
]
. (4.33)
Taking the inverse of Ξ on both sides of (4.29),

dPg
dλ
dτ s
dµs

= Ξ−1Φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λp
 dLd
dCˆs
 . (4.34)
The subscript s of the variables in (4.29), (4.31), and (4.32) represents the subvector
(submatrix) of the original vector (matrix) that corresponds to the binding con-
straints. The matrix Λp in (4.34) is partitioned into two sensitivity matrices—ΛLd
and Λ
Cˆs
:
Λp =
[
ΛLd ΛCˆs
]
=

∂Pg
∂Ld
∂Pg
∂Cˆs
∂λ
∂Ld
∂λ
∂Cˆs
∂τs
∂Ld
∂τs
∂Cˆs
∂µs
∂Ld
∂µs
∂Cˆs

. (4.35)
Using the sensitivities of two shadow prices with respect to Cˆs
(
∂λ
∂Cˆs
, ∂µs
∂Cˆs
)
in Λ
Cˆs
and according to the definition of LMP, we finally construct the matrix ΛA.
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On the other hand, in the Ex-post model, (4.29) can be extended as follows:

M −1Nb Υ
1TNb 0 0
ΥT 0 0


dPg
dλ
dτ s
dµs

=
[
U1
T U2
T U3
T
]
dPˆg
dCˆs
dDˆs
 . (4.36)
Dˆs is the subvector of Dˆ (the real power flow estimate vector) that corresponds to
the binding constraints, and
U3(Bf×[Nb+1+Bg+Bf ]) =
[
0 0Bf 0 IBf
]
. (4.37)
Compared to (4.35), Λp in the Ex-post model is written as
Λp =
[
Λ
Pˆg
Λ
Cˆs
Λ
Dˆs
]
=

∂Pg
∂Pˆg
∂Pg
∂Cˆs
∂Pg
∂Dˆs
∂λ
∂Pˆg
∂λ
∂Cˆs
∂λ
∂Dˆs
∂τ
∂Pˆg
∂τ
∂Cˆs
∂τ
∂Dˆs
∂µ
∂Pˆg
∂µ
∂Cˆs
∂µ
∂Dˆs

. (4.38)
4.3.2.2 Sensitivity of State Estimation to Continuous Sensor Data
Sensitivity analysis of state estimation subject to SCADA measurements was
pioneered by Stuart and Herget [75], who investigated the effect of power system
modeling errors on weighted least squares (WLS) state estimation. A more rigorous
sensitivity analysis method, based on the same perturbation approach illustrated
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in [32], has been proposed by Mı´nguez and Conejo [76]. This method has been
formulated in a general optimization problem that allows for the sensitivity analysis
of alternative state estimation methods with different objective functions, such as the
least absolute value (LAV) from the weighted least squares. It should be noted that,
in this section, the sensitivity analysis is based on WLS state estimation. However,
one can apply it to various state estimation methods by using the method proposed
in [76].
We first derive the matrix ΛB that illustrates the sensitivities of the real power
injection and real flow measurement estimates with respect to the changes in all types
of measurements. In equation (4.4), the matrix Ψ(xˆk) is defined and partitioned as
Ψ(xˆk) = [G(xˆk)]−1HT (xˆk)R−1 =
 Ψθˆ(xˆk)
Ψ
Vˆ
(xˆk)
 (4.39)
where Ψθˆ(xˆ
k) and Ψ
Vˆ
(xˆk) represent the sensitivities of the voltage phase angle
estimates and the magnitudes with respect to all perturbed measurements at the
k-th iteration, respectively. Therefore, (4.4) can be rewritten as
 dθˆk+1
dVˆk+1
 =
 Ψθˆ(xˆk)
Ψ
Vˆ
(xˆk)
 dz. (4.40)
It should be noted that the DCOPF-based SCED is formulated with linearized real
power injection and a flow estimation solution [77]. Using the linear equations in the
upper partition of equation (4.40) and the matrix Ψθˆ computed with the converged
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estimate xˆ, we have the following sensitivity equation:
dzˆr =

BSPθ
BPθ
BFθ
 dθˆ =

BSPθ
BPθ
BFθ
Ψθˆdz = Kdz (4.41)
where
K =

BSPθ
BPθ
BFθ
Ψθˆ. (4.42)
dzˆr is the perturbed estimate vector of the real power injection and the flow mea-
surements. The matrix BPθ = ArBdA
T
r is defined as the (Nb − 1) × (Nb − 1)
reduced node-to-node susceptance matrix that explains the relationship between
real power injections at any bus except the slack bus and the phase angles. Here
Bd = diag(s1, s2, . . . , sNl) is the Nl × Nl diagonal branch susceptance matrix and
Ar is the (Nb − 1) × Nl reduced node-to-branch incidence matrix without a slack
bus. According to the law of conservation of power, the 1 × (Nb − 1) matrix
BSPθ = −1T(Nb−1)BPθ is derived, and it explains the relationship between real power
injections at the slack bus and the phase angles. The matrix BFθ = BdA
T
r specifies
the relationship between real power flows and the phase angles. Using (4.42), we
compute the matrix ΛB = K.
Remark 5. The proposed sensitivity analysis is beneficial in several ways. Through
on-line predictions of LMP variations, system operators can identify economically
sensitive buses with respect to data corruption. This could help system operators
prioritize sensor data quality upgrades in view of robust market operations. From
a practical perspective, the proposed approach can be easily integrated into applica-
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tions in existing energy management systems (EMSs) or market management systems
(MMSs).
Remark 6. The sensitivity index (4.20) can be used to provide the following system-
wide metrics that alert system operators to the jth most and kth least influential
sensors on LMP, on average, with respect to a total of Nb buses and T dispatch
intervals:
j = argmax
j
(
Nb∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣Λ(t)(i,j)∣∣∣ /NbT
)
k = argmin
k
(
Nb∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣Λ(t)(i,k)∣∣∣ /NbT
)
.
4.3.3 Numerical Example
In this subsection, we illustrate and verify the proposed approach to quantifying
the sensitivities of real-time LMP with respect to changes in sensor data. The pro-
posed sensitivity analysis is applied to IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems. System
data for the IEEE 14-bus system are taken from the MATPOWER 4.0 IEEE 14-bus
test case file. Table 4.2 shows the generator parameters in the IEEE 14-bus system.
Table 4.2: Generator parameters of the IEEE 14-bus system.
Bus Pmingi (MW) P
max
gi
(MW) ai($/MWh) bi($/(MW)
2h)
1 0 332.4 20 0.043
2 0 140 20 0.25
3 0 100 40 0.01
6 0 100 40 0.01
8 0 100 40 0.01
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In this simulation, the measurement configuration consists of 8 voltage magnitude
measurements, 8 pairs of real and reactive power injection measurements, and 12
pairs of real and reactive power flow measurements. Vi is the measurement of voltage
magnitude at bus i, Pi and Qi are the measurements of real and reactive power
injection at bus i, respectively, and Pi,j and Qi,j are the measurements of real and
reactive power flow from bus i to bus j, respectively. Fig. 4.3 shows the IEEE
14-bus system with a measurement configuration that consists of the following five
measurement sets:
Sv = {V2, V3, V7, V8, V10, V11, V12, V14} (4.43)
Sri = {P2, P3, P7, P8, P10, P11, P12, P14} (4.44)
Sai = {Q2, Q3, Q7, Q8, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q14} (4.45)
Srf = {P1,2, P2,3, P4,2, P4,7, P4,9, P5,2, P5,4, P5,6, (4.46)
P6,13, P7,9, P11,6, P12,13} (4.47)
Saf = {Q1,2, Q2,3, Q4,2, Q4,7, Q4,9, Q5,2, Q5,4, Q5,6, (4.48)
Q6,13, Q7,9, Q11,6, Q12,13}. (4.49)
In this measurement configuration, the locations of the voltage magnitude mea-
surements are consistent with those of the real and reactive power injection measure-
ments. For each measurement set, the measurement index is numbered from one to
the total number of measurements in each set.
We assume that all measurements are corrupted by additive Gaussian noises
with equal variances σ2=0.00001. Finally, for all buses i, j, and k, we compute LMP
sensitivities with respect to the five types of measurements—real/reactive power
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Figure 4.3: IEEE 14-bus system with a given measurement configuration.
injection, real/reactive power flow, and voltage magnitude—as follows:
∂pii
∂Pj
,
∂pii
∂Qj
,
∂pii
∂Pj,k
,
∂pii
∂Qj,k
,
∂pii
∂Vj
. (4.50)
Units for the sensitivities
{
∂pii
∂Pj
, ∂pii
∂Pj,k
}
,
{
∂pii
∂Qj
, ∂pii
∂Qj,k
}
, and
{
∂pii
∂Vj
}
are ($/MWh)/(puMW),
($/MWh)/(puMVAr), and ($/MWh)/(puV), respectively.
These figures provide information about the directions of the post-corruption
LMPs as well as their sensitivities with respect to each type of measurement at a given
dispatch time. In this simulation, after the Ex-ante dispatch problem has been solved,
there exist two binding generation capacity constraints: Pg3 and Pg8 are binding at
Pˆming3 and Pˆ
max
g8
, respectively. We assume that the corruption of the measurements
impacts the binding constraint associated with Pg3. In other words, the corrupted
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measurements affect Pˆming3 (an intermediate variable in (4.21)), subsequently leading
to changes in all the LMPs. We randomly choose seven buses (buses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
10, 13) out of the fourteen to differentiate clearly the LMP sensitivities among the
various buses. The absolute values of the LMP sensitivities at buses 3 and 5 are
the largest and smallest, setting the upper and lower bounds for sensitivity at the
fourteen buses. We obtain from the simulation results the following observations:
(O1) Sensitivity grouping property : all buses can be categorized into two sensitivity
groups. In each group, buses obtain sensitivities with the same sign, but of
different magnitude and subject to all types of measurements. Group I in-
cludes buses 1, 2, 3 and 5, and Group II buses 4, 10 and 13. For example, in
Fig. 4.4(b) the corruption of z2 yields positive sensitivities for Group I and neg-
ative sensitivities for Group II, whereas the corruption of z6 yields the reverse:
negative sensitivities for Group I and positive sensitivities for Group II. This
grouping property enables system operators to predict rapidly the direction of
LMP’s distortion in response to sensor data corruption.
(O2) Identification of buses that are economically sensitive to data corruption: buses
incident to both ends of the congested line have the highest LMP sensitivities
with respect to sensor data corruption. For example, bus 3 in Group I and bus 4
in Group II incident to congested line 3-4 have the largest absolute sensitivities
in each group. In particular, it should be noted that the largest sensitivities are
associated with bus 3. This implies that bus 3 is the most financially vulnerable
to any corruption in sensor measurement.
(O3) Identification of influential sensors on LMP : the sensor most influential on
LMP change is identified in each measurement group. In Fig. 4.4(a),(b), the
sensors with z2 (P3 and Q3) have the most significant impact on LMP. This is
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due to the fact that the change of the intermediate variable Pˆming3 is dominantly
affected by P3 and Q3, subsequently leading to more change in LMP. This
effect is also verified in the figure on p. 93 (a),(b) based on the IEEE-118 bus
system. In Fig. 4.4(c),(d) and (e), the sensors with z8, z11 and z3 (P5,6, Q11,6
and V7) are the most influential, respectively. In addition, it should be noted
that the localized effects on increasing sensitivity of measurements adjacent to
the congested line and/or the intermediate variable do not always hold true.
For example, z11 (P11,6) is farther away from both the congested line and the
intermediate variable than z5 (P4,9); however, in Fig. 4.4(c), data corruption in
the former leads to a higher sensitivity than in the latter. This non-localized
data effect motivates system operators to use our developed tool for identifying
which sensors impact LMP sensitivity.
(O4) Impact of different types of sensor data on LMP : through a comparison of
all the figures, LMP appears to be more sensitive to real power injection/flow
measurements than to reactive power injection/flow and voltage magnitude
measurements. In order to compare the sensitivities of different units fairly, a
normalized LMP sensitivity |zj |∂pii∂zj is defined, which is incorporated into the
following proposed metric:
Ωik =
|Sk|∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣|zj |∂pii∂zj
∣∣∣∣ / |Sk| (4.51)
where Ωik is the average of the absolute normalized sensitivities at bus i with
respect to any measurement zj in the set Sk (k = v, ri, ai, rf, af). The car-
dinality of the set |Sk| means the number of elements in Sk. For example, at
bus 3, we compute Ω3ri = 0.474, Ω
3
rf = 0.253, Ω
3
v = 0.175, Ω
3
af = 0.013, and
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Ω3ai = 0.012, which is consistent with our expectation that real power injection
and flow measurements have a more significant impact on LMP sensitivity than
other measurements. This is due to the fact that DCOPF-based SCED is con-
ducted based on a linearized state estimation solution that is more influenced
by real power measurements than by reactive power and voltage magnitude
measurements, as illustrated in (4.40) and (4.41).
(O5) In Fig. 4.4(e), LMP sensitivities at all buses affected by corrupted voltage
magnitude measurements fluctuate more smoothly than the ones affected by
other types of corrupted measurements. In other words, all voltage magnitude
measurements impact LMP variations almost evenly. In addition, the non-
localized effect mentioned in (O3) is also verified between z2 (V3) and z3 (V7).
Fig. 4.5 provides snapshots of the Ex-post LMP sensitivities at arbitrarily chosen
buses (buses 1, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14) with respect to the aforementioned five types of
sensor measurements. In this simulation, line 6-12 is assumed to be congested at both
Ex-ante dispatch and Ex-post dispatch. Pˆ6,12 is chosen as an intermediate variable
to compute LMP sensitivity. We can observe from Fig. 4.5 the same phenomena as
in Fig. 4.4: (O1) Group 1 for buses 1 and 6, and Group 2 for buses 7, 9, 12, 13
and 14; (O2) buses 6 and 12 incident to the congested line have the largest absolute
value of LMP sensitivity in each group; (O3) in Fig. 4.5(a) and (b), the sensors with
z7 (P12 and Q12) have the most significant impact on LMP, and in Fig. 4.5(c), (d)
and (e), the sensors with z8, z12 and z5 (P5,6, Q12,13 and V10) are the most influential,
respectively; and (O4) & (O5) real power measurements have a stronger impact on
LMP sensitivity than the reactive power and voltage magnitude measurements, and
the voltage magnitude measurements influence LMP sensitivity almost evenly.
In addition, these analytical LMP sensitivity results have been checked using the
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivities of Ex-ante prices with respect to (a) real power injection
measurements, (b) reactive power injection measurements, (c) real power flow mea-
surements, (d) reactive power flow measurements, and (e) voltage magnitude mea-
surements. Line 3-4 is congested and Pg3 is binding at Pˆ
min
g3
in the IEEE 14-bus
system.
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivities of Ex-post prices with respect to (a) real power injection
measurements, (b) reactive power injection measurements, (c) real power flow mea-
surements, (d) reactive power flow measurements, and (e) voltage magnitude mea-
surements. Line 6-12 is congested and the corresponding line flow is binding at the
capacity limit of line 6-12 in the IEEE 14-bus system.
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perturbation method
(
f ′(x) ≈ [f(x+)−f(x)]

)
. It has been verified that the sensitivity
results obtained from the proposed analytical method are consistent with those from
the perturbation method. Fig. 4.6 shows LMP sensitivities and corresponding actual
price deviations with respect to the four randomly chosen measurements in the IEEE
14-bus system. These results are obtained in the same setup as the Ex-ante simula-
tion in this section. From Fig. 4.6(a), (c), (e), (g), we observe that the sensitivities
from the perturbation method ( [fn(xm+)−fn(xm)]

with  = 0.01) are consistent with
those from the proposed analytical method (Λn,m =
∂pin
∂zm
). Fig. 4.6(b), (d), (f), (h)
shows actual price deviations computed by economic dispatch and the proposed
method (Λn,m × ) when  = 0.01, respectively. As we can see, both results are
consistent with each other.
Fig. 4.7 shows actual Ex-ante LMP and how they differ when they have or do not
have corrupted data at all buses. It is assumed that the magnitude of z8 is corrupted
by 2% in Fig. 4.4(c). In the Chi-squares test [43] within a 99% confidence level, the
estimated objective functions and the bad data detection threshold are computed.
J(xˆ) = 15.69 and J (b)(xˆ) = 30.17 correspond to the values of the estimated objective
functions without and with corrupted data, respectively, and χ2 = 38.93 is the value
of the bad data detection threshold. It should be noted that since J (b)(xˆ) = 30.17 <
χ2 = 38.93, the corrupted measurement z8 bypasses the bad data detection engine,
which could then lead to LMP distortion. As expected, Fig. 4.7 justifies the result
of our sensitivity analysis in two main ways. First, the prices at buses 1, 2, 3, and 5
in Group I change in a positive direction whereas the prices at the buses in Group
II change in a negative direction. This observation explains the grouping property
specified in (O1). Second, the descending order of the magnitudes of the actual
price deviations is in accordance with that of sensitivity magnitudes. For example,
Fig. 4.4(c) shows that buses 3, 2, 1 and 5 in Group I are in descending order of
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of sensitivities between the perturbation method ( = 0.01)
and the proposed method with respect to (a) P3 corruption, (c) Q3 corruption, (e)
P5,6 corruption, and (g) Q5,6 corruption in Fig. 4.6(a), (c), (e), (g). Comparison of
price deviations between economic dispatch and the proposed method with respect
to (b) P3 corruption, (d) Q3 corruption, (f) P5,6 corruption, and (h) Q5,6 corruption
in Fig. 4.6(b), (d), (f), (h).
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Figure 4.7: LMP differences between with and without corrupted data when z8 is
corrupted in Fig. 4.4(c).
sensitivity magnitudes, which is consistent with the descending order of the actual
price deviations at those same buses in Fig. 4.7.
Fig. 4.8 shows the Ex-ante LMP deviations that are caused by the undetectable
same amount of corruption in each measurement group {P3, Q3, V3} and {P5,6, Q5,6}.
These figures show that real power injection and flow measurements have a more
significant impact on LMP than other measurements. This fact justifies observation
(O4).
Fig. 4.9 shows the impact of sensor measurement accuracy on LMP sensitivity.
In this figure, four plots represent LMP sensitivities at bus 3 in Fig. 4.4(a), with con-
sistently varying variances of the two injection measurements z2 (P3) and z6 (P11).
These sensitivities are measured at four different variance levels; σ2=0.00005, 0.0001,
0.0005, and 0.001. We can observe from Fig. 4.9 that, as the measurement variance
decreases (i.e., the measurement accuracy increases), the corresponding LMP sen-
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Figure 4.8: LMP differences between with and without corrupted data in Fig. 4.4
(a) P3, Q3, and V3 corruptions (b) P5,6 and Q5,6 corruptions.
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Figure 4.10: IEEE 118-bus system.
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Figure 4.11: Sensitivities of Ex-ante prices with respect to (a) real power injec-
tion measurements, (b) reactive power injection measurements, (c) real power flow
measurements, (d) reactive power flow measurements, and (e) voltage magnitude
measurements. Line 15-17 is congested and Pg19 is binding at Pˆ
max
g19
in the IEEE
118-bus system.
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sitivity increases. In other words, more accurate sensors lead to more change in
LMP while sensor data remain corrupted. This shows the coupling between state
estimation accuracy and LMP calculation. Based on this observation, one possible
guideline for mitigating the financial risk from data corruption is to make it a high
priority to protect accurate sensors.
For the IEEE 118-bus system, with 54 generation buses and 186 transmission lines
as shown in Fig. 4.10, we assume that real and reactive power injection measurements
are placed at 49 generator buses, voltage magnitude measurements at 9 generator
buses, and real and reactive flow measurements at 129 lines. Therefore, this system
has a total of 365 measurements. System data for the IEEE 118-bus system are
taken from the MATPOWER 4.0 IEEE 118-bus test case file.
Fig. 4.11 show the Ex-ante LMP sensitivities at buses 15, 17, 35, and 75 in the
IEEE 118-bus system with line 15-17 congestion with respect to the five different
types of measurement. The magnitudes of the sensitivities at buses 15 and 17 are
the highest in each sensitivity group. Pˆmax19 is chosen as an intermediate variable
to compute LMP sensitivity. As expected, all observations from Fig. 4.4 are also
verified in the larger IEEE 118-bus system: 1) sensor grouping property (Group
1: buses 15 and 35, and Group 2: buses 17 and 75); 2) identification of the most
economically sensitive buses in each group (buses 15 and 17) and the most influential
sensors (e.g., z10 with P19 and Q19 in Fig. 4.11(a), (b)) on LMP change; and 3) the
impact of different types of sensor data on LMP (e.g., the more significant impact of
real power measurements than other types of measurements).
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4.3.4 Discussions
4.3.4.1 PMU Implementation
Recently, with Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) being increasingly deployed in
power systems, novel hybrid state estimation methods based on traditional SCADA
and PMU measurements have been intensively investigated [78, 79, 80, 81]. The
state estimation measurement model (4.1) presented in this dissertation can be easily
expanded into a hybrid model (e.g., equation (12) in [79]). Using the same steps
illustrated in Subsection 4.3.2.2, our proposed approach quantifies LMP sensitivity
with respect to PMU as well as SCADA measurements.
4.3.4.2 Dependent Sensor Measurements
Recent studies have speculated that state estimation measurements with a sub-
station may be correlated, and proposed as a response a novel dependent weighted
least square (DWLS) state estimation method that considers measurement depen-
dencies [82]. These methods differ from the traditional weighted least square (WLS)
method based on independent measurements only in that it computes the nondiago-
nal covariance matrix of dependent measurements using the point estimate technique
in the WLS formulation. By simply replacing diagonal covariance matrix R in (4.2)
with a computed nondiagonal covariance matrix, our proposed formulation is also ap-
plicable to any LMP sensitivity analysis subject to dependent sensor measurements.
4.3.4.3 LMP Sensitivity to Network Topology Errors
Section 4.3 is limited to the study of LMP sensitivity with respect to changes in
the analog data corruption-induced power flow estimate. A very important extension
of our work here would be to study LMP sensitivity with respect to network topology
estimate changes caused by corrupted digital sensor data such as the on/off status
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of a circuit breaker. A key part of this task would be to investigate how such LMP
sensitivity is analytically expressed as a function of topology information such as
the generation shift factor matrix and corrupted digital data. As an initial step in
this direction, recent work of ours in Section 4.4 proposed a simple LMP sensitivity
index that accounts for the relationship between changes in network topology and
LMP during single transmission line congestion. This index quantifies the economic
impact of network topology errors on LMP and is expressed in terms of the energy
costs of marginal units and the congested line-related generation shift factors at any
bus and marginal units. Here, a marginal unit is defined as a unit that generates
power in a range somewhere between its minimum and maximum capacity. Future
work should include the development of a sensitivity index that evaluates the cyber
impact of digital data on network topology estimate.
4.4 Impact Analysis of LMP Subject to Network Topology Estimate
Errors
4.4.1 Introduction
Locational marginal price (LMP) is the key variable to competitive wholesale
electricity markets. In real-time power markets, LMP is obtained as the by-product of
security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). SCED is formulated with the state
estimation solution (e.g., the estimated power flow and network topology) based on
sensor data in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Therefore,
data corruption may result in the significant change of real-time LMP via state
estimation. The subject of this section is to examine the impact of power network
topology estimation error on real-time market operations.
The transmission-level network model of a power system, namely, the bus/branch
model is built by topology processor using discrete data (e.g., the on/off status of
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circuit breakers (CBs)) collected by SCADA sensors. Bad CB status data are gen-
erally detected and identified by topology error processing using continuous data
(e.g., power injection/flow and voltage magnitude), and afterwards topology proces-
sor rebuilds a corrected bus/branch model. Based on this corrected model, the state
estimation and economic dispatch process compute the optimal estimate of the en-
tire power system’ state and the dispatch instruction such as the optimal generation
output and LMP, respectively.
In this section, we assume that topology data attacks succeed, and focus on their
economic impacts on real-time market operations. The main contributions of this
section is twofold:
• We propose a simple analytical index that explains the relationship between
the change in network topology (i.e., the left-hand side of constraints in SCED)
and LMP.
• The proposed analytical approach is illustrated and verified in the IEEE 14-
bus system. Using the proposed approach, we identify the most economically
impacting transmission line/CBs and sensitive bus to topology error.
The proposed LMP sensitivity index provides system operators an online analysis
tool to predict the effects of the induced topology errors on real-time LMP. From
a practical perspective, this tool can be easily integrated into applications in the
existing MMS.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.4.2 provides the brief overview
of models for state estimation, topology error processing, and real-time power market.
A LMP sensitivity index with respect to topology error is derived in Subsection 4.4.3.
Subsection 4.4.4 verifies and illustrates the derived sensitivity index in the IEEE 14-
bus system.
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4.4.2 Preliminaries
The main notations used throughout this section are summarized in Table 4.3.
Bold symbols represent vectors or matrices.
4.4.2.1 Topology Error Processing
We consider a state estimation model based on a linearized DC power flow. The
measurements taken by each sensor are written by
z = Jx + e (4.52)
where x is the state vector of the entire power system, z is measurement vector, e
is independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random measurement error
vector with zero mean and covariance matrix R, and J is the true system Jacobian
matrix of the state vector x. Then, the weighted least squares estimate of x is
calculated by
xˆ(z) = (JTR−1J)−1JTR−1z. (4.53)
Topology error processing detects and identifies topology errors based on mea-
surement residuals. The wrongly reported circuit breaker status data generate two
types of topology errors: (i) line status error; and (ii) substation configuration error.
The former represents an incorrect exclusion/inclusion of transmission lines from the
network model whereas the latter a split/merging error of buses at the substation. In
this section, we focus on line status error and substation configuration error is beyond
the scope of this dissertation. For line status error, the measurement equation (4.52)
is rewritten as
z = JEx+ Ex+ e
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Table 4.3: Nomenclature.
n Index for buses n
l Index for transmission line l
Ci Energy cost for generator i
G Set of generators
Pgn Total real power output at bus n
pi Real power output at generator i
Ldn Fixed demand at bus n
pmini , p
max
i Min/max generation limits for generator i
Fminl , F
max
l Min/max flow limits at line l
Hl,n Distribution factor of transmission line l to bus n
λ Shadow price of the system energy balance equation
τ Shadow price vector of the capacity constraints
for generators
µ Shadow price vector of the constraints for transmission
lines
Nb Total number of buses
Nl Total number of transmission lines
1k k × 1 column vectors with all ones
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where J = JE+E. Here, JE is the incorrect system Jacobian matrix due to topology
errors. E is the system Jacobian error matrix. Then, topology error detection is
performed using the normalized residual vector as follows:
E(rN) = Ω−
1
2 (I−KE)Mf = Sf
H1
≷
H0
η (4.54)
whereM is the measurement-to-branch incidence matrix, f is a vector of branch flow
errors, KE = JE(JE
TR−1JE)
−1JE
TR−1, Ω = diag{Cov(r)}, S = Ω− 12 (I −KE)M is
the sensitivity matrix for rN with respect to branch flow errors f , and η is the
threshold of topology error detection. H1 and H0 correspond to the cases with and
without topology error, respectively. In this section, we assume that the attack
proposed in [37] successfully changes network topology estimate while bypassing
topology error detection (4.54).
4.4.2.2 Real-Time Power Market Model
Real-time power market consists of the two main pricing models: Ex-ante (e.g.
in ERCOT, NY ISO) and Ex-post (e.g. in ISO New England, PJM, and Midwest
ISO). Since Ex-ante and Ex-post models rely on the network topology and the cost
functions of generators, our results illustrated in the next section are applicable to
both models. In this section we consider a real-time Ex-ante market model where
LMPs are computed before the actual deployment of dispatch orders. For the system
operator, the Ex-ante dispatch is formulated as follows,
min
pi
∑
i∈G
Ci · pi (4.55)
s.t.
λ :
Nb∑
n=1
Pgn =
Nb∑
n=1
Ldn (4.56)
τ : pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ∀i ∈ G (4.57)
µ : Fminl ≤
Nb∑
n=1
Hl,n(Pgn − Ldn) ≤ Fmaxl ∀l = 1, . . . , Nl (4.58)
In this formulation, the objective function is to minimize the total generation costs
in (4.55). (4.56) is the system-wide energy balance equation. (4.57) is the physical ca-
pacity constraints of each generator. (4.58) is the transmission line constraints. λ, τ ,
and µ are the dual variables associated with the aforementioned equality and inequal-
ity constraints. τ and µ are expressed as τ = [τ Tmax, τ
T
min]
T and µ = [µTmax,µ
T
min]
T
where subscript max(min) represents max(min) inequality constraint. Hl,n is the
element at the lth row and nth column of the Nl ×Nb distribution factor matrix H.
This matrix explains the sensitivity of branch flows to nodal injection powers. The
real-time LMP vector pi is computed using the following equation:
pi = λ1Nb −HT [µmax − µmin] . (4.59)
4.4.3 Derivation of LMP Sensitivity to Network Topology Error
In this subsection, we derive a simple sensitivity index to quantify the impact of
network topology errors on LMP. This derivation is based on the following assump-
tions:
(A1) Only one single transmission line is congested for both cases with and without
topology error.
(A2) Network congestion patterns and marginal units remain unchanged with topol-
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ogy error.
(A3) The value of λ (LMP at slack bus) remains unchanged with topology error.
In (A2), a marginal unit is defined as a unit that generates power between its min-
imum and maximum capacity. The above assumptions would hold true under the
situation in which other lines except a congested line have sufficient transmission
capacity. It should be noted that these assumptions do not capture all the possi-
ble scenarios in actual operation. However, a large number of scenarios would fit
into these assumptions under normal to lighted loading situations. Future work will
expand the analysis to a broader set of scnarios.
We first present Proposition 1 where the shadow price associated with a congested
line is expressed as the ratio of the gap of the energy costs of marginal units to the
gap of distribution factors that correspond to the intersections of marginal units
and the congested transmission line. It serves as the theoretical basis for the main
result of this section (equation (4.75)), which does not require extensive numerical
simulations in order to determine the sensitivity of LMP to network topology errors.
Proposition 1. Let i and j be two marginal units with Cj > Ci, belonging to different
buses. Then, the shadow price for the congested transmission line l is expressed as
µl =
∆C(j, i)
∆Hl(i, j)
(4.60)
where ∆C(j, i) = Cj − Ci and ∆Hl(i, j) = Hl,i −Hl,j.
Proof. The shadow price of a congested transmission line is defined as the change of
total dispatch cost via relaxing the transmission constraint by one unit. Thereore,
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the shadow price for the congested transmission line l can be written as
µl = −
∑
i∈G
Ci∆pi, (4.61)
which satisfies the following two constraints:
Nb∑
n=1
∆Pgn = 0 (4.62)
Nb∑
n=1
Hl,n∆Pgn = 1. (4.63)
(4.61) is the increasing total generation cost. (4.62) represents that the overall de-
mand still needs to be balanced. (4.63) is the line flow equation obtained by relaxing
the constraint of the transmission line l by 1MW. Then, using (4.61) and (4.62),
µl
(a)
= −Ci∆Pgi − Cj∆Pgj
(b)
= −Ci∆Pgi + Cj∆Pgi
= (Cj − Ci)∆Pgi
(4.64)
where (a) follows from the property that a single transmission line congestion yields
two marginal units [83], thus setting the variable ∆Pi associated with any other unit
to be zero, and (b) follows from (4.62). Similarly, (4.63) can be rewritten as
1 = Hl,i∆Pgi +Hl,j∆Pgj
= Hl,i∆Pgi −Hl,j∆Pgi
= (Hl,i −Hl,j)∆Pgi.
(4.65)
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Finally, the combination of (4.64) and (4.65) provides the following desired result,
µl =
[Cj − Ci]
[Hl,i −Hl,j] =
∆C(j, i)
∆Hl(i, j)
. (4.66)
Proposition 1 together with (A1)-(A3) implies the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. Consider the situation under (A1)-(A3). Suppose that the line l is
congested. Then, the LMP sensitivity index with respect to the line k status error
(k 6= l) is written as
∆pikl = ∆C(j, i)v
k
l (4.67)
where
∆pikl =
[
∆pikl,1, . . . ,∆pi
k
l,Nb
]T
(4.68)
vkl = [v
k
l,1, . . . , v
k
l,Nb
]T (4.69)
vkl,n =
H˜kl,n
∆H˜kl (i, j)
− Hl,n
∆Hl(i, j)
. (4.70)
Proof. For simplicity, the shadow price corresponding to only a positive line conges-
tion is considered in (4.59). Under assumption (A1)-(A2), the LMPs vectors without
and with the line k status error are written as
pil = λ1Nb − µlHTl (4.71)
p˜ikl = λ˜
k1Nb − µ˜kl H˜kTl (4.72)
where Hl is the lth row vector of the distribution factor matrix H. In (4.72), a tilde
symbol over characters refers to topology error. Then, under assumption (A3) (i.e.,
λ = λ˜k) the LMP sensitivity vector that illustrates the differences between LMPs
without and with topology error is written as
∆pikl = pil − p˜ikl = µ˜kl H˜kTl − µlHTl . (4.73)
From Proposition 1, the shadow price corrupted by topology error is expressed as
µ˜kl =
[Cj − Ci][
H˜kl,i − H˜kl,j
] = ∆C(j, i)
∆H˜kl (i, j)
. (4.74)
Finally, substituting (4.66) and (4.74) into (4.73),
∆pikl =
[
∆C(j, i)
∆H˜kl (i, j)
]
H˜kTl −
[
∆C(j, i)
∆Hl(i, j)
]
HTl
= ∆C(j, i)
[
H˜kTl
∆H˜kl (i, j)
− H
T
l
∆Hl(i, j)
]
= ∆C(j, i)vkl .
(4.75)
That is, the sensitivity of LMP at any bus to any line status error is written as the
multiplication form of two independent functions which depend on: (i) the energy
costs of marginal units; and (ii) congested line-related distribution factors at any bus
and marginal units, respectively.
Corollary 2. For any buses n and m (n 6= m),
(a) If vkl,n > 0, LMP at bus n with topology error decreases, otherwise it remains the
same or increases.
(b) |vkl,n| > |vkl,m| implies that LMP sensitivity at bus n is higher than at bus m.
(c) The increase (decrease) of ∆C(j, i) leads to the increase (decrease) of LMP sen-
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sitivity at any bus.
By Corollary 2(a), buses can be categorized into three groups with positive, neg-
ative and zero sensitivities. This grouping property enables system operators to
make a quick prediction for the direction of post-LMPs by topology error. By Corol-
lary 2(b), economically sensitive buses to topology error can be identified through the
comparison of |vkl,n|. Corollary 2(c) allows system operators to assess the impact of
the energy costs of marginal units on LMP sensitivity. Furthermore, it may provide
guidelines for making a bidding strategy of market participants such as generation
company. Fig. 4.12 illustrates a linear relationship scaled by ∆C(j, i) between ∆pikl
and vkl , as well as sensitivity grouping, identification of economically sensitive buses
and impact of varying ∆C(j, i) on LMP sensitivity, all of which are mentiond in
Corollary 2.
??? 
Threshold of sensitivity grouping 
Slope=??(?, ?) 
Slope=???(?, ?) ???? 
???,? ???,? ???,? ???,? 
Group I for positive LMP sensitivity 
Group II for negative LMP sensitivity 
The highest sensitivity at bus n 
among p, q, m, n buses 
Figure 4.12: Illustration of a linear relationship between ∆pikl and v
k
l .
106
Remark 7. Let us relax the assumption (A2). That is, topology error generates
new marginal units p and q with cost functions Cp and Cq with Cq > Cp and a new
congested line l˜. Then, LMP sensitivity equations are categorized into four different
cases as follows:
Case 1: both unchanged congestion pattern and marginal units (This case corre-
sponds to Corollary 1)
∆pikl = ∆C(j, i)
[
H˜kTl
∆H˜kl (i, j)
− H
T
l
∆Hl(i, j)
]
(4.76)
Case 2: unchanged congestion pattern but changed marginal units
∆pikl = ∆C(q, p)
[
H˜kTl
∆H˜kl (p, q)
]
−∆C(j, i)
[
HTl
∆Hl(i, j)
]
(4.77)
Case 3: changed congestion pattern but unchanged marginal units
∆pik
l,l˜
= ∆C(j, i)
[
H˜kT
l˜
∆H˜k
l˜
(i, j)
− H
T
l
∆Hl(i, j)
]
(4.78)
Case 4: both changed congestion pattern and marginal units
∆pik
l,l˜
= ∆C(q, p)
[
H˜kT
l˜
∆H˜k
l˜
(p, q)
]
−∆C(j, i)
[
HTl
∆Hl(i, j)
]
. (4.79)
The results in Remark 8 can be used to derive an analytical form for the profit
through virtual bidding mechanism.
Remark 8. LMP sensitivity index can be used to provide the following system-
wide metrics that alert system operators to the kth most and jth least influential
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transmission line on LMP, on average, with respect to a total of Nb buses and T
dispatch intervals:
k = argmax
k
(
Nb∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∆pik,tl,n∣∣∣ /NbT
)
j = argmin
j
(
Nb∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∆pij,tl,n∣∣ /NbT
)
.
and to the n1th most and n2th least influential bus on LMP, on average, with respect
to a total of Nl transmission lines and T dispatch intervals
n1 = argmax
n1
(
Nl∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∆pik,tl,n1∣∣∣ /NlT
)
n2 = argmin
n2
(
Nl∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∆pik,tl,n2∣∣∣ /NlT
)
.
4.4.4 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we illustrate and verify the proposed analytical results in
quantifying the impact of network topology errors on LMP in the IEEE 14-bus
system. Fig. 4.13 shows the detailed bus-breaker model for the IEEE 14-bus system.
In this figure, one scenario is illustrated where the misconfigured status of the circuit
breaker at bus 5 leads to the (dotted) line 4-5 exclusion error as long as the line 5-6
is congested. It is assumed that this misconfiguration occurs due to a natural error
or man-made attack and hence the corrupted network topology information is fed
into economic dispatch module without being detected by topology error processing.
Table 4.4 shows generator parameters in the IEEE 14-bus system.
Figs. 4.14 show the LMPs from the scenario illustrated in Fig. 4.13. Fig. 4.14(a)
shows LMPs at all buses with and without the line exclusion error, respectively.
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Figure 4.13: IEEE 14-bus system including bus-breaker model.
Table 4.4: Generator parameters of the IEEE 14-bus system.
Bus Pmin Pmax Marginal Cost
1 0MW 330MW 30$/MWh
2 0MW 140MW 20$/MWh
3 0MW 100MW 40$/MWh
6 0MW 100MW 55$/MWh
8 0MW 100MW 60$/MWh
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Figure 4.14: LMP results in Fig. 4.13: (a) comparison of LMPs between with and
without line exclusion error; (b) comparison of LMP sensitivities obtained by SCED
and the proposed approach.
These LMPs are obtained as the by-product of SCED formulated in Section 4.4.2. It
should be noted in this scenario that the exclusion of the line 4-5 keeps both marginal
units (at buses 1 and 8) and congestion pattern (the line 5-6 congestion) unchanged.
Fig. 4.14(b) shows two LMP sensitivity plots for all buses with respect to the line
4-5 exclusion. Each plot is obtained using a different approach, which is based on
SCED and the proposed analytical approach in Corollary 1. We emphasize again
that in comparison with SCED approach the proposed approach computes LMP
sensitivities using the derived sensitivity index without further economic redispatch.
This could lead to reduced computational time compared with exhaustive numerical
simulations. We can observe from Fig. 4.14(b) that the result of the proposed ap-
proach is consistent with that of SCED. This observation also holds true in other line
exclusion cases under different network congestions. However, due to limited space,
the validity of the test results for all other cases is not shown in this section. We
note that LMP sensitivities in all subsequent figures are computed in the proposed
approach.
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Fig. 4.15 illustrates the impact of a varying gap between the energy costs of
marginal units on LMP sensitivity. The results in this figure are based on the same
system condition as in Fig. 4.13 so that marginal units are connected to buses 1 and
8, respectively. The energy cost of generator at bus 8 in Table 4.4 is assumed to
increase from 60$/MWh to 75$/MWh with a step size of 5$/MWh, thus changing
the value of ∆C(8, 1) from 30 to 45. We can observe from Fig. 4.15 that as the
gap between the energy costs of marginal units increases, the absolute value of LMP
sensitivity at any bus increases as well. This observation justifies Corollary 2(c).
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Figure 4.16: Comparison of LMP sensitivities with four different branch exclusion
errors under the line 5-6 congestion.
Fig. 4.16 shows LMP sensitivities with four different line exclusion errors under
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the identical congestion pattern where the line 5-6 is congested. For a clear com-
parison of sensitivities, we randomly choose four different lines (lines 1-2, 1-5, 2-4
and 6-12) out of twenty lines and then exclude each line from the network model to
evaluate the impact of the line exclusion on LMP. First, we observe from Fig. 4.16
that LMP sensitivities at all buses with respect to the line 1-2 exclusion are higher
than those with respect to other line exclusions. Therefore, the line 1-2 among cho-
sen four lines has the most significant impact on LMP sensitivity at any bus. From
a cybersecurity perspective, sensors collecting the status of CBs associated with the
line 1-2 should be protected against bad data or malicious cyber attack with a high
priority. Second, the most economically sensitive bus to topology error is identified
in each line exclusion. For example, bus 6 has the highest sensitivity to the exclusion
of the lines 1-2, 1-5 and 2-4 whereas bus 12 to the exclusion of the line 6-12. Lastly,
we verify that buses are grouped according to the sign of sensitivity. For the line 1-2
exclusion, buses (6, 9∼14) obtain positive sensitivities, buses (2∼5) negative sensi-
tivities and buses (1, 7∼8) have zero sensitivities. In particular, using the sign of
sensitivity system operators are capable of predicting a market participant’ profit or
loss. For example, the sensitivities at generation bus 6 to the exclusions of lines 1-2
and 2-4 are positive so that post LMPs decrease, consequently providing a generation
company a financial loss. On the other hand, since the sensitivities at the same bus
to the exclusions of lines 1-5 and 6-12 are negative, a generation company makes a
profit with increasing LMP.
Fig. 4.17 shows the sensitivities with respect to the line 4-5 exclusion under four
different congestion patterns (the congestions of the lines 1-5, 2-4, 4-9 and 5-6 ). In
this figure, the impact of different congested lines on LMP sensitivity is quantified
for all buses. For example, it is observed that the line 2-4 congestion among the
chosen four line congestions leads to the highest sensitivity at bus 4.
113
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
Bus Location
LM
P 
Se
ns
itiv
ity
($/
MW
h)
 
 
1−5 congestion
2−4 congestion
4−9 congestion
5−6 congestion
Figure 4.17: Comparison of LMP sensitivities with four different congestion patterns
under the line 4-5 exclusion.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation studies the impact of power system sensor data quality on eco-
nomic dispatch via state estimation in real-time power markets. This impact analysis
is conducted from the perspectives of a market participant in Section 3 and a system
operator in Section 4, respectively. In this section, we summarize the main contri-
butions in the above two sections and also point out some potential future work.
5.1 Malicious Data Attack on Look-ahead Dispatch
5.1.1 Summary
Section 3 is concerned about temporal cyber data attacks on state estimation
and their effects on time-coupled look-ahead dispatch. With the assumption of no
network transmission congestion, from a market participant’s perspective we formu-
late a malicious ramp-induced data (RID) attack problem in look-ahead dispatch.
As illustrated in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4, we consider the scenarios where a potential at-
tacker (e.g., generation company) could stealthily change the ramp constraint limits
of generators through manipulating sensors’ data without being detected by bad data
detection, aiming at increasing the nodal price by withholding capacity of generator.
This attack scenario is different from the traditional capacity withholding scenarios
in which a generation company strategically reports capacity noticeably lower than
its maximum capacity. The main result in Section 3 is an undetectable and prof-
itable RID attack method in (3.40)–(3.43). Using malicious sensor data computed by
this method, the attacker could manipulate the ramp constraint limits of generators
for withholding generation capacity, subsequently leading to making a profit in the
real-time power market. This proposed attack method is formulated in Linear Pro-
gramming (LP) so that it can be solved efficiently using an off-the-shelf LP method
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even in a large-scale system. Three attack cases based on the proposed method ((1)
marginal unit attack, (2) binding unit attack, and (3) coordinated attack) are sim-
ulated and their performance is compared in the IEEE 14-bus system. Simulation
results demonstrate the undetectability and profitability in three attack cases.
5.1.2 Future Work
In Section 3, we propose potential temporal data attacks against state estimation
and economic dispatch and quantify their undetectability and profitability in real-
time power markets. However, countermeasures to mitigate the financial risks from
such data attacks are not developed in this dissertation work. To develop these
countermeasures, there are possible directions in the future:
• Robust PMU Placement Algorithm against Cyber Attacks
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are high-security sensors that provide fast,
accurate, and time-stamped measurements that facilitate wide-area monitoring and
control for large power systems [1]. The high cost of PMUs and corresponding com-
munication facilities has been accelerating research into the optimal PMU placement
problem with the minimum number of PMUs. However, most of the current research
on this problem utilizes PMUs for only enhancing power system observability. We
believe that robust PMU placement methods enable system operators to monitor,
detect cyber attacks, and mitigate physical and economic attack risk. By applying
observability-based PMU placement algorithms to the operational level of energy
and market management systems, cyber-secure reslient power system and market
operations can be assured. The proposed methods can be considered in conjunc-
tion with their impacts on the security aspects of communication in power control
networks as well as the physical and economical operations in power systems. This
could lead to fruitful collaboration with researchers in power system engineering and
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communications.
• Data Integrity-Resilient Multi-Area State Estimation
Multi-area state estimation is becoming increasingly popular as the intercon-
nected power system consists of multiple subsystems. An interconnected power sys-
tem is operated by multiple control centers based on their administrative boundaries
(e.g., New England, New York). However, malicious measurement data in one ad-
ministrative area may contaminate the performance indices of other administrative
areas due to the physical coupling among the subsystems. Therefore, it is important
to assess which region may be affected by any given malicious data. The concept
of error residual spread area (ERSA) is proposed to decompose the whole system
into several non-overlapping regions, in which the corrupted data only contaminate
measurements within each region. ERSA decomposition relies on network topology
and measurement configuration. The proposed ERSA decomposition will localize
and prevent data integrity attacks from spreading to a remote location. We plan to
develop a new architecture and algorithm for attack-resilient multi-area state estima-
tion based on ERSA decomposition. Research in this area will have great potential
for interdisciplinary collaborations with researchers in power system engineering and
statistical signal processing.
5.2 LMP Sensitivity Analysis to Data Corruption-Induced Estimation
Error
5.2.1 Summary
In Section 4, from a system operator’s perspective we present an analytical frame-
work to quantify real-time LMP sensitivity subject to sensor data corruption via state
estimation. Two data corruption scenarios are considered: in Section 4.3 corrupted
continuous data (e.g., the power injection/flow and voltage magnitude) falsify power
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flow estimates and in Section 4.4 corrupted discrete data (e.g., the on/off status of
a circuit breaker) falsify network topology estimates.
In Section 4.3, we develop an analytical framework for calculating LMP sensitivity
in response to small variations in SCADA and/or PMU continuous measurement
data. Corrupted sensor data are shown to deviate power system state estimation
from their actual values, which subsequently leads to the distortion of real-time
market LMPs. The main results in Section 4.3 are two sensitivity matrices: the first
with LMP sensitivity at any bus to any estimate in (4.35), (4.38), and the second
with sensitivity of any estimate to data at any sensor in (4.42). A unified matrix
that combines these two matrices in multiplication form enables system operators to
quantify the impact on LMP of data at any sensor at any bus throughout the entire
transmission network. Our simulation results suggest that the proposed sensitivity
matrix can provide system operators with a quick and accurate method to identify
the buses most vulnerable to measurement errors. In addition, we verify that more
accurate sensors impact LMP much more significantly.
In Section 4.4, we examine the impact of circuit breaker-induced network topology
errors on real-time LMP in electric power systems. The main result in Section 4.4
is Proposition 1, which states that the shadow price for the congested transmission
line can be written as the ratio of the gap of the energy costs of marginal units to
the gap of distribution factors that correspond to the intersections of marginal units
and the congested transmission line. Using the result in Proposition 1, we derive an
analytical index in Corollary 1 to compute LMP sensitivity with respect to network
topology error, particularly line status error, in the power system. This index can be
modified to three different cases according to the change of locations of marginal units
and congested line after topology error occurs as shown in Remark 7. Similar to the
sensitivity matrix derived in Section 4.3, the proposed sensitivity index also provides
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system operators an analytical tool to identify economically sensitive transmission
lines and circuit breakers, whose status error will significantly impact the real-time
LMPs. The proposed sensitivity index is illustrated and tested in the IEEE 14-bus
system.
5.2.2 Future Work
Built upon the preliminary work in Section 4, I plan to design new opera-
tional tools for future grid. This is achieved through engineering multi-scale con-
trol/communication systems. This research will be conducted along the following
specific project:
• Data Quality-Aware Multi-Scale Decision Making in Future Grid
High-quality power grid data are essential to the control and management of large
electric power systems in a reliable and economical manner. By leveraging the pre-
liminary work on the impact analysis of data quality in Section 4, I plan to further
develop a unified decision-making framework to investigate the impact of multi-scale
spatial data quality at the transmission and distribution level on energy manage-
ment system (EMS) and market management system (MMS) operations. Data in
the transmission level refer to sensing for physical grid condition (e.g., power flow,
voltage phasor, network topology), electricity market operation (e.g., market par-
ticipants bidding price), and control command (e.g., open/close of circuit breakers,
AGC signal). Data in the distribution level refer to smart metering (e.g., indi-
vidual energy consumption), distributed renewable solar and wind generation, and
energy storage/electric vehicle (e.g., location of sources, storage, and sinks of elec-
tric energy). Our prior work on two-level (EMS, MMS) sensitivity analysis based
on a KKT condition perturbation approach will be extended to a three-level sen-
sitivity approach with added distributed energy management system (DMS) level.
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The proposed sensitivity index is the combination of the coupled partial derivatives
quantifying the sensitivity of parameters in each system. This multi-level sensitiv-
ity approach may be extended to lower levels such as microgrids, building energy
management system (BEMS) and home energy management system (HEMS). The
developed framework can provide system operators with visualization tools on the
level of multi-scale spatial data quality as well as a unified view on the impact of
data quality on operations of EMS and MMS.
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